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1 Introduction 
Oxford Dictionaries has declared "post-truth" as the word of the year 2016. It is defined as ​“an                 
adjective relating to circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public              
opinion than emotional appeals” ​(Oxford Languages 2016) ​. ​Even though this word became that             
popular in 2016 because of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the presidential               
election in the USA, the concept of post-truth had been relevant long before that. 
 
Modern technologies and the social media revolution have filled reality with the overflow of              
information. In today’s reality, it takes almost too much effort to filter accurate information out               
of the stream of spam. Ironically, the information (and the truth) has never been so fragile as                 
today, in ​the information age. ​Not because of Orwell's censorship, but because of Huxley's              
devaluation of truth .  1
 
Naturally, with the development of mass information and communication, the methods of mass             
manipulation and propaganda have also advanced. This study intends to analyze one of the              
world's oldest and most efficient propaganda machines: the one born in the USSR and matured in                
Putin's Russia. 
 
My interest in the issue is rooted in my background as a journalist. I used to work at a Ukrainian                    
news TV-channel in 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula and later advanced its              
military presence in the East of Ukraine. After witnessing everyday lies and manipulations by              
Russian media, I decided to investigate the phenomenal impact of it on people's outlook. Since               
this is a critical study, my personal perspective will inevitably influence its development. With              
this in mind, however, I aim to ensure that the findings of this research are as unbiased and                  
accurate as possible. 
 
1 ​Referring to two classic novels: 1984 Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell and Brave New World by Aldous                  
Huxley. Two extreme predictions of the future back from the 20​th​ century.  
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This study focuses on a rhetorical aspect of propaganda — ​the language of war, ​which is used by                  
Russian media to create enemy images that are essential for justifying armed aggression. ​The              
research touches on relevant issues emerging in the current discourse on informational warfare             
and mass-manipulation. 
 
This study set out to assess the language manipulation efforts of the Russian state-funded online               
media towards their audience: how do they use language to frame publications on Ukraine, and               
how do they portray Ukraine and Ukrainians before and after the conflict has started. The aim is                 
to understand how and why Russian media have influenced the audience's attitudes towards             
Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as a nation and to evaluate if such manipulation can be                 
recognized as propaganda. 
 
The modern Russian propaganda and particularly its activity in the Russia-Ukraine conflict have             
been researched from various angles. All of these studies contribute to an important mission of               
analyzing and exposing the means of Russian informational warfare and its effect on global              
power-relations. However, the discourse on this theme undoubtedly lacks a rhetorical angle on             
enemy creation in Russian online media. This study will address this gap in current knowledge. I                
will critically analyze sixteen articles from two Russian state-funded media organizations in the             
process of this research: eight from the 2013 timeframe when pro-Russian president Yanukovych             
was still in charge, and eight from the 2014 timeframe, after the conflict in Donbas. Rhetorical                
framing analysis will be conducted to define the dominant frames of each period and the               
techniques used to set those frames. 
 
This thesis research proceeds in six chapters. The next chapter provides an overview of the               
Russian neo-authoritarian media system and reviews the geopolitical context of Russia-Ukraine           
conflict. In the third chapter, the key theoretical elements of this study are discussed, including               
the framing theory, enemy images, and framing and propaganda devices. Chapter four focuses on              
the design of this research, elaborating on the rhetorical framing analysis method, listing the              
research questions, describing the collection of data and the process of analysis. In chapter five, I                
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provide the results of the rhetorical analysis with an in-depth focus on the dominant frames that                
have emerged during the analysis. Chapter six is dedicated to a concluding discussion where I               
present the theoretical contribution of this research, its key findings, limitations and challenges,             
and give my recommendations for future research.  
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2 Contexts 
This research examines the enemy framing and manipulation in Russian online media towards             
Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea and the breakout of a de facto armed conflict between                
Russia and Ukraine. The complexity of the topic requires additional background discussion. This             
chapter provides a contextual overview of two dimensions: Russian news media as part of a               
neo-authoritarian media system and geopolitical context of Russia-Ukraine conflict.  
 
2.1 Russian news media: a neo-authoritarian system 
International organizations such as Freedom House or Reporters Without Borders have regularly            
recognized the asphyxiation of the press freedom in Russia since Vladimir Putin took over the               
country (Figure 1). Based on extensive research , these internationally respected organizations           2
rate Russian freedom of press and information as one of the lowest in the world. Such                3
evaluations support the general view on the Russian media ecosystem as an essentially             
neo-authoritarian polity in which journalists face pressing constraints. 
Figure 1. The decline of the Press Freedom in Russia under Vladimir Putin’s government              
captured by Freedom House  4
2 ​https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2019  
3 ​https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table Russia’s press freedom was ranked 148 out of 180 countries by Reporters without               
Borders in 2018. 
4 ​https://freedomhouse.org/report/table-country-scores-fotp-2017 Press Freedom in Russia was ranked 176 out of           
201 countries by Freedom House in 2017. Russia’s press freedom score is 83 (​100 being the worst). 
5 
 
 The term ​neo-authoritarian media system was introduced by Jonathan Becker (2004) in the             
context of Russian media studies . Becker defines the key features that characterise the             5
neo-authoritarian media system: 
● State-owned media have limited autonomy and key positions are offered to politically            
loyal candidates.  
● Access to media channels might be open and private ownership is acceptable too, but the               
content produced is regulated and controlled by other means.  
● The state does not practise direct pre-publishing censorship. Instead, critics of the state             
are silenced by economic pressure and by legal actions against the owners of the media.               
Journalists also risk getting criminal and civil penalties.  
● The state uses resources to control the influential media letting the relatively free small              
media to create the delusion of the freedom of speech.  
For Becker, Russia's neo-authoritarian media system is similar to managed democracy. Russia            
may have formal democratic institutions, but in fact, these institutions are centrally-controlled            
and corrupted (Becker 2004: 149–150). In context of this study, it means that even though there                
are a number of media organizations that may not have direct connection to the state, in one way                  
or another (financially or politically) they are dependent or even controlled by the Kremlin. 
 
Russian journalist, media and political scholar Maria Lipman (2010) points out that the primary              
goal of newly established president Putin in 2000 was to reclaim the power of the state. This                 
meant, first and foremost, restoring the dominant authority of the nation’s leader. Extending state              
control over mass-media was one of Putin's top priorities. His campaign against privately owned              
national media groups started within days of his inauguration in May 2000 (Lipman 2010). 
 
5 It is important to note that Becker's article was published in 2004 when Putin had been president for one term.                     
Since then, the freedom of press and information have faced even more oppression. 
6 
 
The target of the president was not the journalists but the owners of the media — the                 
businessmen who had built successful media corporations after the collapse of the USSR.             
Lipman suggests that the campaign was mostly disguised as business litigation against the media              
tycoons. For example, Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of Media-Most, once the biggest privately             
owned media group in Russia, had to flee abroad. His business was taken over by the                
state-controlled giant Gazprom in the spring of 2001. Eventually, the editorial core of the biggest               
TV-channel in the group (and one of the top three channels in the whole country) NTV was                 
taken under control and kept firmly in line with the Kremlin’s political goals. ORT, the channel                
controlled by another media magnate Boris Berezovsky, was taken by the state at about the same                
time as NTV. Berezovsky was forced to ask for political asylum in the UK. 
 
Greg Simons (2010) recalls the speech Putin made in a meeting with journalists in January 2001.                
The president made it clear that he wanted to see the creation of ​“single information space”                
taking place in Russia. The intention of this plan was to ensure the security and integrity of                 
Russia. ​“Any talk about the unity of the Russian state apparently starts with the formulation of                
its tasks and goals. A single information space is a priority task. It would be worth noting that                  
the word came first”, ​said Vladimir Putin to journalists ​ ​(Simons 2010: 23–24). 
 
In just four years of Putin's presidency, recalls Lipman, the Kremlin had taken full control over                
all three major federal television channels; Svoboda Slova (Freedom of Speech), the only live              
political talk show, was closed; several popular hosts were banned from television. Federal             
channels, whose influence far outweighs all other Russian media, were turned into the Kremlin's              
political tool (Lipman 2010: 128-131). 
 
Such focused allocation of resources to control only the influential media is typical for a               
neo-authoritarian media system. Lipman points out that in the Russian reality of non-competitive             
politics, the Kremlin can afford not to silence every opinion. Moreover, the smaller independent              
media may even be useful for Putin as they create the delusion of the freedom of speech and                  
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provide a platform for critically minded to let off steam. Maria Lipman elaborates on the aching                
powerlessness of independent Russian media in her article Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media             
in Putin’s Russia (2005). Once more, this shows that the modern Russian propaganda system is               
not built around the Soviet-type totalitarian censorship, it rather chooses a lean approach of              
post-truth. For that reason, the scholarly works like Lipman’s are so important — to expose this                
sophisticated manipulative system. 
 
The next step for Putin, after establishing control over the major federal channels, was to               
improve Russia's image abroad. In its Foreign Policy concept of 2013, the Russian government              
declared that it needs to "create instruments for influencing how it is perceived in the world,                
develop effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad, and counteract            
information threats to its sovereignty and security" (Russian Foreign Ministry 2013). Ekaterina            
Skvorovtsova notes that since 2004 the Kremlin has put significant investment into promoting             
the country’s image. Launching the international channel Russia Today in 2005 (rebranded to the              
more neutral “RT” in 2009) was arguably the largest and most expensive state image projects of                
all (Skvorovtsova 2016). 
 
There has been controversy about the funding of the channel. Boris Bruk (2013) draws our               
attention to increasing state funding of RT throughout the years: while the initial amount of               
funds allocated to RT from the state budget was estimated at $30 million, this number has                
dramatically increased as the channel expanded. Ten years later, in 2014, RT's budget grew to               
$360 million (Dorokhina 2014), the channel broadcasts in English, Spanish, and Arabic, and has              
a global reach of over 630 million people in more than 100 countries. According to the grand                 
plans of RT’s founders, the main aim of this media project was to compete with prominent                
international channels, such as CNN International and BBC World, and provide "alternative            
perspectives on current affairs" (RT 2019). 
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Another remarkable project of state media expansion in pursuit of "single informational space"             
happened in 2013 when Vladimir Putin signed a Presidential Decree "On measures to improve              
the efficiency of state media" (Kremlin 2013). This decree declared the creation of a new media                
enterprise called Rossiya Segodnya [Russia Today] funded and operated by the Russian            
government. According to the executive director Dmitry Kiselyov, the main goal of Rossiya             
Segondya was "to restore fair treatment of Russia as an important country with good intentions"               
(Vesti.ru 2013), which strongly resembles the government's foreign policy manifesto. 
 
Two key-propagandists were appointed to be in charge of the organization — Dmitry Kiselev as               
an executive director and Margarita Simonyan was appointed editor-in-chief while still being            
RT's news channel editor-in-chief concurrently. Multiple journalistic and academic publications          
(e.g. Dougherty 2014; Jaitner & Mattsson 2015; Hutching and Szostek 2016) have reported on              
Kiselev's propagandistic activity. Even though my study does not focus on individual journalists,             
the likes of Kiselev and Simonyan as major players of the state's propaganda are worthy of                
mention here. 
 
The official statement of the decree suggests that the government's motivation for creating             
Rossiya Segodnya was purely economical. However, the journalists were alarmed about its            
political nature and the further tightening of state control in the, already heavily regulated, media               
sector (Badanin 2013). Overall, more than $1 billion were allocated from the Russian state              
budget to finance the media in 2014 (Dorokhina 2014). Considering the size and resources of a                
country like Russia, this number may seem quite acceptable, but the heavy-handed suppression             
of press freedom, the framing of the news media narratives in-line with the Kremlin's agenda,               
and complete powerlessness of independent media prove that the Russian government invests not             
just in the state’s soft power, but in information warfare. The strong expression ​information              
warfare is used here on purpose. In 19 years of Putin’s reign, the role of mass (and later also                   6
6 Information warfare, defined by Glenn (1989), is a concept involving the battlespace use and management of                 
information and communication technology (ICT) in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent.              
Information warfare is the manipulation of information trusted by a target without the target's awareness so that the                  
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social) media for the Kremlin has evolved from a tool to secure the next reelection to, as Russian                  
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated, ​"yet another type of weapons, yet another component of              
the armed forces"​ (Interfax 2015).  
 
The fact that Russia is actively in the state of global information warfare has become more                
evident for the wide audience in light of recent investigations regarding Russian interference in              
the 2016 U.S. elections and the Brexit referendum in the UK. These two major cases showed the                 
massive power of social media as a tool of manipulation and persuasion as well as total                
negligence of the social media platforms to counter such destructive meddling and incompetence             
of their users to recognise it.  
 
Facebook confirmed that 3,000 ads linked to 470 accounts or pages were purchased by groups               
linked to the Russian state during the 2016 U.S. elections (Stamos, 2017). Twitter also identified               
50,258 Russian-linked automated accounts that were spreading disinformation and manipulation          
during the presidential campaign of 2016 in the United States (Twitter Public Policy 2018).              
Russian information warfare had started way before 2016, but the Brexit and the U.S. election               
cases revealed the scale of it showing that the billions of US dollars officially allocated on                
"media support" are just the tip of the propaganda iceberg (e.g., Persily 2018; ​Narayanan et al.                
2017) ​.  
 
While this study does not explicitly focus on social media manipulations, this powerful tool in               
Russian propaganda arsenal has to be addressed. This topic certainly requires more research.             
Journalists are naturally at the frontline of the current investigation (e.g. Lipman 2010;             
Garmazhapova 2013; Aro 2015). This role, however, takes their safety at risk. Finnish journalist              
Jessikka Aro started to investigate the activity of paid Russian internet trolls on Finnish public               
debate in 2014 (Aro 2014). Aro identifies “trolls” as ​“part of the Kremlin’s propaganda system               
target will make decisions against their interest but in the interest of the one conducting information warfare. As a                   
result, it is not clear when information warfare begins, ends, and how strong or destructive it is. 
10 
 
and technique of information warfare, these recruited commentators distribute the messages of            
Russia’s political leaders online” (Aro 2016: 122). Shortly after Aro opened her investigation,             
she became the target of disinformation campaigns, online threats and open-source monitoring.            
"The goal is to discredit me, make my work seem unreliable and ultimately stop me from                
disclosing facts about social media propagandists," reflects Aro (2016: 122). Similar public            
discredit and disinformation campaigns are often practiced in Russian information warfare           
against unfavourable politicians, journalists and others who dare to criticize the Kremlin (Aro             
2016). 
 
2.2 The geopolitical context of Russia-Ukraine conflict 
Ukraine has always been within Russia's sphere of influence. Diplomat and political scientist             
Zbigniew Brzeziński said, “it cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to              
be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes             
an empire” (Brzezinski 2013: 95). The format of this research does not allow to fit years of                 
post-imperial tension between the two states. The main focus of this subchapter is the recent               
period between 2013 and 2014, highlighting the milestones of Russian aggression in Crimea and              
the Eastern Ukraine, and the events that had led to it. 
 
To be able to present the sequence of the events in a clear and objective way, the information                  
will be delivered in a format of a timeline based on media chronicles from BBC (2014) and                 
Reuters (2014). The Center for Strategic & International Studies (2018) also provides a more              
thorough interactive record of the crisis in Ukraine covering years 2013 ​–​ 2018. 
 
February 2010 
A pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, is declared the winner in a presidential election             
judged free and fair by observers. 
November 2013 
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President Yanukovych's cabinet suspends preparations for the EU Trade Deal, an agreement on             
closer trade ties with the EU. Instead, seeking closer cooperation with Russia. 100,000 people              
rally in Kiev against rejecting the EU Deal. 
November 30: Riot police tries to break up the Kiev demonstration by force. Protest turns against                
Yanukovych and his government. 
December 2013 
Early December: Protesters occupy Kyiv city hall and turn Independence Square into a protest              
tent city. Rally grows from 350,000 to some 800,000 in Kyiv while Viktor Yanukovych holds               
previously unannounced talks in Sochi with Vladimir Putin on “strategic partnership”. 
December 17: Yanukovych and Putin meet for the second time since the crisis began. Putin               
offers Yanukovych an economic lifeline by agreeing to buy $15 billion of Ukrainian debt and to                
cut by a third the price of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine. 
January 2014 
January 16-23: Parliament passes restrictive anti-protest laws. Thousands rally in Kyiv against            
the protest ban, some clashing with riot police. Three people die during protests and the EU                
threatens action over poor handling of the crisis. Talks between opposition and Yanukovich fail.              
Protesters begin storming regional government offices in western Ukraine. 
January 28-29: Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigns. Parliament revokes the anti-protest law            
and passes the amnesty bill but the opposition rejects conditions. 
February 2014 
February 14-16: All 234 protesters arrested since December are released. Demonstrators leave            
Kyiv city hall, occupied since 1 December 2013, along with other public buildings in regions. 
February 17: Russia boosts Yanukovych with $2 billion cash injection for Ukraine. 
February 18: For an undefined reason, clashes between police and protesters erupt in the worst               
violence since the start of the Maidan demonstrations. 18 people killed. 
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February 20: Kyiv witnesses its worst day of violence since the Second World War. At least 88                 
people are killed in 48 hours. Numerous videos posted online show uniformed snipers firing at               
protesters holding wooden shields.  
February 22: President Yanukovych disappears. Protesters take control of presidential          
administration buildings. Parliament votes to remove the president from power with elections set             
for 25 May. Yanukovych appears on TV to denounce the "coup". His arch-rival Yulia              
Tymoshenko is freed from jail. 
February 23-26: Ukraine names ministers for new government. An arrest warrant is issued for              
Viktor Yanukovych. The Berkut police unit, blamed for deaths of protesters, is disbanded.             
Russia puts 150,000 troops on high alert. Washington warns Moscow against military            
intervention. 
February 27-28: Armed men seize Crimea parliament, raise Russian flag. Unidentified gunmen            
in combat uniforms appear outside Crimea's main airports, described by Ukrainian minister as             
“an invasion by Moscow’s forces”. Ousted Yanukovych appears in Russia after a week on the               
run. 
March 2014 
March 1: Russia's parliament approves President Putin's request to invade Ukraine "to protect             
Russian interests". Ukraine puts troops on high alert. White House warns Russia of economic              
and political isolation. 
March 6: Pro-Russian government in Crimean parliament votes to join Russia and sets             
referendum for March 16, escalating the crisis. U.S. President Barack Obama says the             
referendum would violate international law and orders sanctions on those responsible for            
Moscow’s military intervention in Ukraine. 
March 16: Crimea's referendum on joining Russia is backed by 97% of voters, organizers say.               
Vote condemned by Kyiv and West as a sham. 
March 18: Vladimir Putin signs a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation, which               
finalised the annexation of Crimean Peninsula. 
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April 2014 
April 7: Pro-Russian protesters occupy government buildings in the east Ukrainian cities of             
Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv, and call for a referendum following the Crimea scenario.             
Ukrainian authorities regain control of Kharkiv government buildings the next day. 
April 15: Ukraine's acting President, Olexander Turchynov, announces the start of an            
"anti-terrorist operation" against pro-Russian separatists.  
May 2014 
May 2: Clashes in the Black Sea city of Odesa leave 42 people dead, most of them pro-Russian                  
activists that got trapped in a burning building. 
May 11: Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declare independence after           
unrecognised referendums. 
May 25: Ukraine elects Petro Poroshenko as president in an election not held in occupied               
territories of Eastern Ukraine. 
June 2014 
June 14: Pro-Russia separatists shoot down a military plane in the east. 49 people dead. 
June 25: Russia's parliament cancels the resolution authorising the use of the Russian military in               
Ukraine. 
June 27: The EU signs an association agreement with Ukraine. 
July - September 2014 
July 17: Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam is shot down near the village of               
Grabove in Eastern Ukraine killing all 283 passengers and 15 crewmembers on board. The Dutch               
Safety Board and the Dutch-led joint investigation team concluded that the plane was downed by               
a Russian Buk surface-to-air missile launched from pro-Russian separatist-controlled territory. 
August 7 ​– September 2: The Battle of Ilovaisk. After entering the city of Ilovaisk, the                
Ukrainian Armed Forces got encircled by overwhelming Russian military forces that crossed the             
border, joining the pro-Russian separatists. After days of keeping the Ukrainian soldiers            
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besieged, Vladimir Putin promised a humanitarian corridor, which would allow the trapped            
soldiers to leave Ilovaisk. Russian troops attacked the retrieving column, which led to 366              
Ukrainian soldiers killed and 429 wounded.  
August 26: Ukraine's security service releases videos of Russian paratroopers captured in eastern             
Ukraine as an evidence of Russian military presence in the conflict. They are later exchanged for                
Ukrainian soldiers. 
September 5: Ukraine, Russia and pro-Russian separatists sign a ceasefire protocol in Minsk. It              
failed to stop fighting in Donbas, which led to another summit in Minsk on 11 February 2015.                 
So-called Minsk II addendum was developed and signed by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia,              
France, and Germany. As reported by Ukrainian news agency UNIAN (2018), not a single              
provision of the Minsk deal has been 100% implemented. 
Figure 2. The Ukraine Crisis Timeline 
 
As of May 2019, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is still unsettled. According to the UN                
Monitoring Mission on Human Rights (OHCHR 2019: 6), from 14 April 2014 to 15 February               
2019, some 12,800 to 13,000 people were killed in the war in Donbas, of which at least 3,321                  
were civilians. More than a hundred political prisoners and prisoners of war are illegally detained               
in Russia (Coynash 2019). 
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 Russian neo-authoritarian media system and its impact on the conflict between Russia and             
Ukraine have been researched from various angles. For example, Makhortykh and Sydorova            
(2017) address visual framing in social media during the conflict in Donbas. Hutching and              
Szostek (2016) provide an overview of Russian media narratives regarding the conflict, and Aro              
(2014; 2015; 2016) with her series of investigations tackles the problems of disinformation and              
curated trolling as tools of informational warfare. All of these studies contribute to an important               
mission of analyzing and exposing the means of Russian propaganda. However, the discourse on              
this theme is significantly lacking a rhetorical angle on enemy creation in Russian online media.               
This research was developed to address this gap in the literature.  
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3 Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Framing Theory 
To be able to unfold the complexity of language manipulations in mass media, we need to break                 
down the communication chain and take a closer look at its components. In this chapter, the                
literature on enemy images and language manipulation techniques will be reviewed. In the             
context of media discourse and agenda setting, framing and propaganda devices will also be              
examined in more detail. 
 
Having reviewed the previous studies, by the end of this chapter, the reader should have a better                 
understanding of the following topics: 
● Deconstruction of the mass media discourse process. 
● The process model of framing: how does framing work in news media? 
● Framing and propaganda devices and their impact on masses. 
● What can be defined as an enemy image and how can it be framed into mass media                 
discourse? 
 
Marais and Linström (2012) hold the view that the agenda-setting theory and the framing theory               
are the two main theories of media effects. McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) propose the               
term second-level agenda-setting implying that framing is, in fact, an extension of            
agenda-setting. Jasperson et al. (1998: 206) elaborate, clarifying that the traditional           
agenda-setting does not explicitly focus on the implications of coverage within an issue while the               
framing ​“provides a means of describing the power of communication to direct individual             
cognitions towards a prescribed interpretation of a situation or object” (Jasperson et al. 1998:              
206). 
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In this research, the framing theory will be used as a foundation for media analysis. This will                 
enable a thorough examination of the media discourse with a focus on the process of framing                
manipulative messages, language used for that and possible effects on the audience.  
 
Framing theory is deeply rooted in Erving Goffman's (1974) work Frame Analysis: An essay on               
the organization of experience. Goffman used the idea of frames to label “schemata of              
interpretation” that allow people “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences or events             
(Goffman 1974: 21). Today, as a number of studies apply this approach (e.g., Entman, 1993;               
Scheufele, 1999; D’Angelo 2002; Kuypers 2010; Marais and Linström, 2012), framing has            
evolved into a popular theory in media analysis. According to Entman (1993), frame analysis              
serves four main purposes within the context of media research: to define problems, to diagnose               
a course, to make value judgments, and to suggest remedies (Entman 1993: 52). 
 
There is no generally accepted definition of framing but the existing ones are quite similar. Gaye                
Tuchman, in her book Making news: A study in the construction of reality (1978: 1) uses the                 
metaphor of a window to explain frames in news media: 
“News is a window on the world, and through its frame, Americans learn of themselves and                
others, of their institutions, leaders, and lifestyles, and those of other nations and other peoples.               
The news aims to tell us what we want to know, need to know, and should know. But, like any                    
frame that delineates a world, a news frame may be problematic. The view through a window                
depends upon whether the window is large or small, has many panes or few, whether the glass is                  
opaque or clear, whether the window faces a street or a backyard.” 
 
Fifteen years before that, Cohen (1963: 13) published a dictum in which he states that press                
“may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly                  
successful in telling readers what to think about.” This point of view perfectly describes framing               
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as a persuasive tool used in public communication to make striking points that would direct the                
audience to a desired frame of mind. 
 
In his definition of framing, Qing (2000: 666) brings up the role of the journalist's language in                 
building frames: 
“News is a representation of the world mediated via the journalist. Like every discourse, it               
constructively patterns that of which it speaks. Differences in expression carry ideological            
distinctions and thus differences in representation. The content of news stories, therefore,            
represents ideas, beliefs, values, theories, and ideology. The major role of news language as              
discourse is to supply the categories imposed by the journalist on the event itself.” 
 
The term frame building, used above, is borrowed from Cobb and Elder’s (1972) agenda-setting              
study. Similar to their model of agenda building, the key question here is what kinds of                
organizational or structural factors of the media system, is there any pressure from the owners or                
a state, or which individual features of journalists can impact the framing of news discourse               
(Figure 3). 
 
In his work Framing as a Theory of Media Effects, Dietram A. Scheufele (1999) points out the                 
lack of a commonly shared theoretical model underlying framing research and systematizes the             
fragmented approaches into a process model of framing research (Figure 3). It allows researchers              
to characterize framing as a continuous process where outcomes of specific processes serve as              
inputs for subsequent processes. 
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Figure 3. A process model of framing research (Scheufele, 1999: 115) 
 
Scheufele’s model of framing breaks down the framing process into two levels: ​media frames              
and ​individual or audience frames ​that are shaping and influencing each other. According to              
Gamson and Modigliani (1987), media frames are ​“a central organizing idea or storyline that              
provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events… The frame suggests what the controversy is               
about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143). Entman (1993) provides a more thorough definition of                
media frames emphasising ​selection and ​salience which makes it possible to differentiate            
framing as a media effect from approaches like ​agenda setting or ​gatekeeping​. ​“To frame is to                
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,                
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral              
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993: 52). An example of a media            
frame could be an article or a report that promotes a certain agenda, or it could be a quote cited                    
out of context to show the author in a bad light, etc. Through media frames, journalists can                 
manipulate the audience’s perception of the events and people featured in the news.  
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 Previous studies have indicated at least five factors that may affect how journalists frame a               
certain topic: social norms and values, ideological or political orientations of journalists,            
organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups and journalistic routines           
(e.g., Tuchman, 1978; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). In his model of framing (Figure 3), Scheufele               
places these factors into the ​Inputs​ of media frames. 
 
Audience frames (Figure 3). For Entman (1993), individual frames represent ​“mentally stored            
clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (p. 53). Scheufele (1999)             
points out that often researchers (e.g. Iyengar 1991) that examine the individual-level outcomes             
of framing assume a direct link between media frames and individual-level outcomes, skipping             
the effect of audience frames. This means that media frames do not create attitudes and behaviors                
by default — first, they translate into audience frames that are different for each individual. The                
audience frame is layered on top of existing beliefs, thus adding more color to the individual                
palette of attitudes.  
 
On media-level of framing, this research examines the language of media frames and linking the               
manipulations to propaganda inputs; on the individual-level of framing, it explores enemy            
images as audience frames and frame setting as a process of enmity creation. 
 
3.2 Framing and Propaganda Devices 
When it comes to identifying frames in a media narrative, there is no unified set of framing                 
devices. Scholars that study framing devices generally operate within a common range of             
meanings while applying different approaches. For instance, Marias and Linström (2012)           
identify two groups of framing devices based on their application: ​rhetorical devices and             
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technical devices​. Alternatively, Pan and Kosicki (1993: 59-61) distinguish framing devices           
based on four ​structural dimensions​:  
● Syntactic structures refer to the patterns in the arrangement of words or phrases. Such              
patterns can claim empirical validity by quoting experts, link certain points of view to              
authority as well as marginalize certain points of view linking it to a social deviant; 
● Script structures ​refer to the fact that the news narrative is based on storytelling. Pan and                
Kosicki compare a reporter writing a news story to a storyteller or a novelist writing a                
fictional story. As a result, news reports often appear to be excessively fragmented,             
personalized and dramatized; 
● Thematic structures ​can be often identified in so-called issue stories and usually contain             
certain hypothesis-testing features, e.g. events are cited, sources are quoted, and           
propositions are pronounced; all function as logical support for the hypothesis which            
journalist is trying to prove and thus impose a certain opinion on the audience;  
● Rhetorical structures describe the stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their             
intended effects. All the rhetorical framing devices mentioned above — metaphors,           
exemplars, catchphrases, depictions — belong to this category. 
 
Regardless of taxonomy, all the devices mentioned above essentially involve selection and            
salience. Entman (1993: 52) emphasizes that frames can be manifested by both the ​presence or               
absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and            
sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments. 
 
Building frames does not necessarily create manipulation. As Scheufele (1999: 115) points out,             
journalists actively use frame building simply to structure and simplify large amounts of             
information. Framing devices are a toolset in the journalist's arsenal and it is up to him or her                  
how these tools will be used. Therefore, in the context of this study, it is important to get                  
acquainted not only with the framing devices but also with the propaganda devices in media               
discourse.  
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Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell (2018:151) point out that after World War II, researchers               
tended to avoid using the term "propaganda" when referring to their subject of study and               
replaced it with various constructs of "persuasion". Since this study examines the media             
manipulations in the context of an armed conflict, the term "propaganda" and the "propaganda              
devices" as a phenomena are relevant and appropriate for this research. In this study I define                
propaganda devices as the rhetorical tools of propaganda. When identified in the media text,              
these devices may indicate that the given material is a product of propaganda. 
 
The construct of the seven propaganda devices, introduced by the Institute for Propaganda             
Analysis (IPA) in 1937, has been claimed to be "the most ubiquitous and long-lasting among the                
many frameworks for propaganda criticism" (Sproule 2001: 135). When detected in a media text,              
the propaganda devices can indicate that the input of a certain media frame is state propaganda.                
The Seven propaganda devices identified by IPA (Miller 1937) are the following: 
● Name calling is a labelling technique. It attaches a bad label to certain ideas, individuals               
or groups with the purpose of making the audience reject or condemn them without              
examining the evidence. Examples of such stigmatizing names are “fascist,” “radical,” or            
“terrorist”. 
● Glittering generalities is the opposite of name calling. This device associates ideas or             
people with virtue words such as “truth, freedom, patriot, progress, etc.” As with name              
calling, the effect on the audience is that people form a thoughtless judgment under the               
influence of an emotional impression. 
● The ​Transfer device may carry both positive and negative connotations. It involves            
associating an event, idea or person with something or someone respected and admired             
(Mother Teresa, Gandhi, etc.) or someone perceived as evil (Nazis, Kim Jong-un, etc.).             
Using the audience’s reverence for national or religious symbolism is typical for this             
form of manipulation. 
● The Testimonial device uses someone with social value (respectable or hated) to endorse             
an idea or person thus linking them and creating a certain trust or association. 
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● With the ​Plain folks​' technique, the persuaders represent themselves as “just plain folks”,             
representatives of the people (versus the elite or versus the enemy), and hence building              
trust to the persuaders' ideas. 
● Card stacking is the device of selective omission. Similarly to Entman's (1993) definition             
of framing that is driven by selection and salience, the card stacking device uses              
overemphasis and underemphasis to put a calculated spin on certain ideas or events.             
Persuader’s narrative and structural distortions throw up a smokescreen which makes the            
audience forget disturbing information and embrace half-truths. 
● The ​Bandwagon technique is based on the power of numbers. Here, propagandists use the              
peer-pressure to impose a certain opinion and frame it as truth or a fact. Focus often is on                  
appealing to ties of nation, religion, race, region, sex, class or other groups. 
 
Even though the bulletin with seven propaganda devices was published in the late 1930s, these               
techniques are still applicable, widely used in media and studied by modern scholars (e.g.              
Conway et al. 2007; Hobbs and Mcgee 2008; Cozma 2015). While constantly evolving             
technology is transforming the channels and speed of communication, the core tools of             
persuasion, identified by the IPA, remain relevant.  
 
3.3 Enemy Images in Mass Media 
Both the framing and propaganda devices can serve various purposes of persuasion and             
influence, but this study will focus on one goal of propaganda which is the creation of ​enemy                 
images​ to justify potential military aggression. 
 
Several scholars (e.g., Steuter & Wills 2009; Vuorinen 2012) hold the view that the creation of                
an enemy, or ​the ​Other, requires ​the Self to be in place. This means that the inclusion of some                   
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into a certain group or community (e.g. religious, national or political groups), necessarily leads              
to the exclusion of others.  
 
The idea of otherness is based on Freudian ​projection​, the social-psychological concept coined             
by Sigmund Freud. Projection filters what is considered evil, weak or otherwise faulty from the               
Self by attaching these features to another person or group in order to mentally protect the Self.                 
Edward Said (1978) extrapolates this phenomenon to a global scale in his remarkable work              
Orientalism​. For Said, the Western colonial and imperial projects would not be possible without              
the projection of otherness onto the East as a counter-image of the West. 
 
In her work on war propaganda, Marja Vuorinen (2012) highlights the distinction between             
otherness and enmity, two identity-reversing concepts of exclusion. She points out that every             
enemy is the Other but not all others may necessarily be enemies. The creation of an enemy                 
always starts with the creation of the Other. A similar connection can be seen between enemy                
images and stereotypes. For Vuorinen, enemy images are stereotypes in the most negative sense              
of the word but not all stereotypes may necessarily be labelled as enemy images. 
 
Vuorinen (2012) claims that the enemy image is basically an embodiment of threat: "It              
represents imminence of unwanted acts towards the Self and motivates a need to remain vigilant,               
to plan defence or even to actively engage in a pre-emptive first attack" (Vuorinen 2012: 3).                
Debra Merskin argues that the construction of enemy images is vital for justifying an unjust war                
and is necessary if “power elites want to move military and diplomatic policies forward without               
full disclosure but with maximum public support" (Merskin 2005, 121).  
 
Louis Oppenheimer (2006) points out that societies with limited access to free information and              
open political discussions tend to have "strong hostile and antagonistic attitudes toward others"             
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(p. 275). He argues that stereotypes and enemy images can be perceived as personal beliefs as                
well as tools influenced by certain groups to achieve particular objectives. This point of view               
assumes that enemy images are the individual-level outcomes of framing (Figure 3). Scheufele             
(1999) warns that such omission of the audience frames, when examining the texts, is quite               
common in communication studies and may distort the results. 
 
When applied to Scheufele's model of framing (Figure 3), in the context of news media               
discourse, the concept of enemy images falls into the category of Audience Frames. Influenced              
by the state, the owners or journalist's political views, and so on (Media Level Input), a certain                 
message gets built and framed into the news material (Frame Building), thus creating Media              
Frames (Media Outcome). If a frame can be identified as the Propaganda Device, it most               
certainly indicates that the material is serving particular interests (state's or owners') by             
influencing the audience. Such influence creates or adjusts already existing (Frame Setting)            
Audience Frame (Audience Input) or in context of this study also — an enemy image. If the                 
Frame Setting relies heavily on triggering stereotypes, mocking, or excluding particular groups            
or individuals, creating a hostile perception of a particular group or individual, it may create or                
reinforce an Enemy Image. This study aims to identify the dominant media frames in the               
analyzed articles, to examine what devices are used to build those frames, and what messages are                
they setting in order to create enemy images as audience inputs. 
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4 Research Design 
4.1 Rhetorical framing analysis 
In the last 25 years, framing analysis has evolved from a fractured paradigm (Entman 1993) to a                 
more robust yet flexible framework (D'Angelo & Kuypers 2010), which leans towards the             
quantitative orientation (Kuypers 2010: 286). Framing research is predominantly derived from a            
social scientific orientation. Grounded in quantitative assumptions, framing analysis,         
traditionally, has been conducted by coding and measuring predefined frames. In this thesis, I am               
turning to a less commonly used qualitative approach by investigating the framing of enemy              
images in Russian online media from a rhetorical angle.  
 
As Reese (2007: 10) explains the value of the qualitative approach to framing analysis, it "helps                
resist the reductionistic urge to sort media texts and discourse into containers and count their size                
or frequency.” Wood (2004: 69) argues that “not all communication can be measured             
quantitatively, and quantitative data cannot provide substantial insight into the texture and            
meaning of experiences.” Wood (ibid.) elaborates that “qualitative methods are valuable when            
we wish not to count or measure phenomena but to understand the character of experience,               
particularly how people perceive and make sense of their communication experience. This            
involves interpreting meanings and other unobservable dimensions of communication”.  
 
I have used Jim Kuypers' study Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective (2010) as a               
guideline for building the methodology for this study. In his research, Kuypers provides an              
overview of how to approach framing analysis from a qualitative (i.e. a rhetorical) angle. The               
rhetorical analysis was aligned with this particular study in terms of the purpose of research, the                
project design and the type of knowledge to be generated, therefore I chose to embrace this                
orientation. 
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The rhetorical approach of framing analysis falls within the critical paradigm described by             
D’Angelo (2002) in his exploration of news framing metatheory. According to Denton and             
Kuypers (2008), when critical scholars analyze and interpret utterances, they go beyond            
quantitative assumptions and can allow themselves to take a subjective, in-depth look at framing              
devices. A scholar operating from within the critical paradigm examines how news frames affect              
the political consciousness of audiences. This is the aim of this study as well. 
 
Jim Kuypers points out that since a rhetorical act is a multidimensional, complex, and nuanced               
event, it requires critical scholars to be able to use different perspectives. This allows a               
researcher to see different aspects of the rhetorical act. ​"For instance, a perspective grounded in               
the theory of narrative will orient the critic to narrative elements; a perspective grounded in the                
theory of framing will orient the critic to framing elements" ​(Kuypers 2009: 297).  
 
Kuypers (ibid: 297) reminds scholars to be cautious when applying perspectives to their analysis              
regardless of which one they choose. Perspectives are to help a researcher, not to direct the                
criticism. A critic operating from a rhetorical perspective would be asking: How do language              
choices invite the audience to understand and interpret a particular issue or event? Adding a layer                
of context to this question allows me to formulate the first ​research question​ of this study: 
RQ 1: How do language choices in analyzed Russian media invite the audience to perceive               
Ukraine and Ukrainians? 
To answer this question, I have analyzed media frames which Scheufele in his model of framing                
(Figure 3) identify as the outcome of ​frame building and the foundation of ​frame setting​. There is                 
a direct link of ​frame setting between media frames and audience perception and I address this                
link with my first research question.  
 
28 
 
Figure 3. A process model of framing research (Scheufele, 1999: 115) 
 
The second key-link of the framing process in focus of this research is ​frame building​. It leads us                  
from media frames to their inputs: ideologies, organizational or state pressures that influence             
journalists. When analyzing the language choices in Russian media, not only do I aim to               
understand how these choices influence the audience, I also want to understand what made the               
journalists make those particular choices. I want to detect political and ideological influences in              
media activity, and, in order to do that, I have analyzed the articles published before the                
Euromaidan revolution, when the pro-Russian president Yanukovych was in charge, and after the             
annexation of Crimea and the conflict’s breakout in Donbas. Furthermore, if the analyzed frames              
have been identified as the ​Propaganda Devices it indicates that the material is serving certain               
interests (state's or owners') and is a product of propaganda. 
RQ 2: How does the framing of stories about Ukraine in the analyzed Russian media change                
after the Euromaidan revolution? 
RQ 3:​ Can the analyzed articles be recognized as a product of propaganda? 
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4.2 Data collection 
In the material selection process, I was following the guidelines of Marais and Linström (2012),               
Patton (2002), and Kuypers (2010). The focus medium of the study is online media. Media               
selection was based on three main conditions: content availability, state influence, and size. The              
first condition was a technical one implying that selected media should have an archive of               
materials in place covering the period of 2013-2014. The size and state influence conditions were               
necessary to qualify the analyzed publications as a product of propaganda. It means that the               
media organization should have national or transnational coverage and has to be funded by the               
Russian government. 
 
Taking these conditions into account, two media organizations were selected: international           
network RT and the information agency Rossiya Segodnia which includes subsidiaries RIA            
Novosti and Sputnik. Even though RT and Rossiya Segodnia proclaim that they are in no-way               
related organizations, not only do they share one name but also the same editor-in-chief —               
Margarita Simonyan. This is another example of the Kremlin's “single information space”            
program: the same funding source, same management, same mission, but different target            
audience. 
 
To be able to address the RQ 2 and to compare how the framing changes with time, two                  
timeframes were selected: from May to August of 2013, when the pro-Russian president             
Yanukovych was governing in Ukraine; and from May to August of 2014, after the Russian               
annexation of Crimea and the breakout of the armed conflict in Donbas region.  
 
The timeframes allowed me to narrow down the initial data pool and break it down into two                 
groups. After that, purposeful intensity sampling was applied to each group to identify the              
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"information-rich cases that manifest the phenomenon intensely, but not extremely" (Patton           
2002: 243). 
 
The preliminary query to retrieve the articles was conducted under the search terms of              
“Украина” (Ukraine, in Russian); "Украина армия" (Ukraine army); "Украина войска"          
(Ukraine military); "Украина президент" (Ukraine president). The contrast in the number of            
articles published during the selected timeframes was quite extraordinary (Table 1). For example,             
during the whole analyzed period of ​three months in 2013, RT has published 67 articles with the                 
keyword "Ukraine" in them. In 2014, in just ​three ​days, ​RT has produced 259 articles with the                 
same keyword. Overall, in the analyzed period of 2014, Rossiya Segodnya has produced nearly              
10 times more articles and RT about x100 more articles with the keyword “Ukraine” compared               
to the same period in 2013 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Preliminary collection of the materials 
Media 
Channel 
Timeframe Number of 
results for 
search term 
“Ukraine” 
Number of 
results for 
search term 
“Ukraine 
army” 
Number of 
results for 
search term 
“Ukraine 
military” 
Number of 
results for 
search term 
“Ukraine 
president” 
Rossiya 
Segodnya (RIA 
& Sputnik) 
01.05 - 
31.07.2013 
1,483 93 67 411 
RT 01.05 - 
31.07.2013 
67 4 3 13 
Rossiya 
Segodnya (RIA 
& Sputnik) 
01.05 - 
31.07.2014 
14,795 2,339 1,066 5,958 
RT 01.05 - 
31.07.2014 
6,264 915 431 1,677 
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From the preliminary data pool, I scanned 200 publications to be able to get the needed material                 
for further analysis. 30 information-rich materials based on the topic, size and information             
delivery were then selected for inductive frame search within the dominant themes in news              
narratives. As a result, 16 publications (8 per timeframe) were identified for in-depth rhetorical              
frame analysis. In this process, I was following Alozie's (2005: 66) approach to identify news               
frames: 
- Step1: General multiple reading of the articles while taking descriptive notes about the             
content; 
- Step 2: A second reading to identify certain recurring themes, frames, values and topic              
categories;  
- Step 3: In-depth interpretation of the articles. 
 
In the next chapter, I present the key findings of the in-depth analysis and systematize the results                 
providing examples from the articles. Since the articles are originally in Russian, I also provide               
my own translation into English proofread by a native speaker.  
 
Table 2. Analyzed materials — Final data pool 
Article 
Reference 
Number and 
Media 
Channel 
Date Title (original) Title (English 
translation) 
Source 
RT 13-1  22.06.2013 В ночь на 22 июня в 
странах бывшего СССР 
зажгли «свечи памяти» 
On the night of June 22, 
“candles of memory” 
were lit 
in the countries of the 
former USSR  
https://russian.rt.com/
article/11124 
RT 13-2 27.07.2013 Владимир Путин: 
Украинская экономика, 
объединившись с 
российской, получит 
большие конкурентные 
преимущества 
Vladimir Putin: The 
Ukrainian economy, 
combined with the 
Russian, will receive 
great competitive 
advantages 
https://russian.rt.com/
article/13103 
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RT 13-3 28.07.2013 Владимир Путин 
поздравил российских и 
украинских моряков 
Vladimir Putin 
congratulated Russian 
and Ukrainian sailors 
https://russian.rt.com/
article/13132 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-4 
08.05.2013 Генеральная репетиция 
парада войск Украины и 
РФ прошла в 
Севастополе 
The dress rehearsal of the 
military parade of 
Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation took place in 
Sevastopol 
https://ria.ru/2013050
8/936423346.html 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-5 
29.05.2013 Меморандум об участии 
Украины в ТС подпишут 
в Минске 31 мая 
Memorandum on 
Ukraine’s participation in 
the Customs Union will 
be signed in Minsk on 
May 31 
https://ria.ru/2013052
9/940172922.html 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-6 
09.05.2013 День Победы на 
Украине: праздник со 
слезами на глазах 
Victory Day in Ukraine: 
a holiday with tears in 
the eyes 
https://ria.ru/2013050
9/936567575.html 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-7 
27.07.2013 БТР утонул во время 
репетиции ко Дню флота 
Украины в Севастополе 
BTR drowned during a 
rehearsal for the Day of 
the Fleet of Ukraine in 
Sevastopol 
https://ria.ru/2013072
7/952443800.html 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-8 
27.07.2013 Путин поблагодарил 
Януковича за встречу на 
торжествах в Киеве 
Putin thanked 
Yanukovych for meeting 
at the celebrations in 
Kyiv 
https://ria.ru/2013072
7/952470376.html 
RT 14-1 15.05.2014 Народный губернатор 
ДНР Губарев предъявил 
новый ультиматум 
киевским властям 
People's Governor of the 
DPR Gubarev presented 
a new ultimatum to the 
Kyiv authorities 
https://russian.rt.com/
article/32106 
RT 14-2 01.07.2014 Украинские силовики 
возобновили активную 
фазу карательной 
операции на востоке 
страны 
Ukrainian forces resumed 
the active phase of the 
punitive operation in the 
east of the country 
https://russian.rt.com/
article/38880 
RT 14-3 13.07.2014 Штурм украинскими 
силовиками Мариуполя 
— первые фото и видео 
с места событий  
The assault of Mariupol 
by the Ukrainian force 
officers - the first photos 
and videos from the 
scene 
https://russian.rt.com/
article/36280 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-4 
19.06.2014 Карательное 
миротворчество. 
Президент Украины 
объявил войну 
Punitive peacekeeping. 
President of Ukraine 
declared war 
https://radiosputnik.ri
a.ru/20140619/10126
75160.html 
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Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-5 
14.07.2014 "Внутренняя война" на 
Украине - Петр 
Порошенко как 
украинский Пиночет 
"Internal War" on [in] 
Ukraine - Petro 
Poroshenko as Ukrainian 
Pinochet 
https://ria.ru/2014071
4/1015823162.html 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-6 
17.07.2014 Обама Бен Ладен. США 
ударили Россию в самый 
"сектор" 
Obama Bin Laden. The 
USA hit Russia right in 
the "sector" 
https://radiosputnik.ri
a.ru/20140717/10163
98563.html 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-7 
18.07.2014 Бесполезная зона. 
Украина официально 
стала "черной дырой" 
Useless zone. Ukraine 
has officially become a 
"black hole" 
https://radiosputnik.ri
a.ru/20140718/10165
95884.html 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-8 
31.07.2014 Жители Марьинки: 
силовики использовали 
снаряды, похожие на 
фосфорные 
Residents of Maryinka: 
force officers used 
phosphorus-like shells 
https://ria.ru/2014073
1/1018365593.html 
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5 Results: Dominant Frames and Propaganda 
Devices 
 
To be able to address the research questions fully and thoroughly, this chapter is broken down                
into five subchapters each focusing on one or more dominant frames that were inductively              
identified within this research. Dominant and secondary frames unfold a strategic level of             
framing and enmity setting — ​what ideas are framed in the analyzed articles and why​, and how                 
it changes over time. Within each subchapter, I also provide examples of framing and              
propaganda devices that are forming a particular frame. The devices illustrate the tactical level of               
framing meaning ​what messages transmit the ideas and how. ​As was expected, most frames,              
framing and propaganda devices were identified in the second timeframe of the study — in 2014,                
after the annexation of Crimea and the breakout of armed conflict in Donbas. The publications               
from 2013 were much more neutral compared to the samples from 2014. I expand more on the                 
comparison of the two timeframes in the Discussion. 
 
5.1 Unity of the two nations  
The "Unity of the two nations" (Russia and Ukraine) frame is present in most of the analyzed                 
articles of the 2013 period (6 out of 8 articles) as a dominant or a secondary frame. By contrast,                   
in the materials from 2014, this frame was not present at all.  
 
The "unity of the two nations" is the only positive frame found in this analysis. Even though this                  
frame has a positive connotation, it revolves around the idea of self and otherness. This frame                
portrays Ukraine and Russia as allies with a common heritage while putting them against the               
"other" on many levels: On a historical level, Ukraine and Russia are framed as the heirs of the                  
Soviet Union (self) that heroically defeated Nazi Germany (other) in World War II, or as they                
call it in Russia, The Great Patriotic War. On an economic level, the polarization lies between                
Russian-influenced Eurasian Customs Union (self) and the European Union (other). In 2013, the             
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Ukrainian government was faced with a choice of which trade agreement to sign: with the               
Eurasian Customs Union or the EU. Ultimately, this choice (or rather an unexpected change of               
it) was the reason for the Euromaidan protests that grew into a revolution in 2013-2014. On a                 
cultural and religious level, the emphasis is put on the Russian orthodox church as a unifying                
factor with its traditionalist conservative views as opposed to the Western liberal views. On a               
geopolitical level, the "other" is NATO, and the uniting "self" is close military and naval               
partnerships that Russia and Ukraine had in 2013. 
 
Thus the "unity of the two nations" frame is reinforcing passive enemy images of the liberals, the                 
West, the EU, the USA and the Third Reich that were activated in 2014 and applied to Ukraine                  
in various contexts to accelerate alienation and hostility of what recently used to be a "brother                
nation". According to Vuorinen (2012: 4), ​"when a passive enemy-image is activated and made              
into a motive for action, the situation is apt to escalate into conflict. Most elaborate enemy                
imagery is related to wars between nations when propaganda is broadcasted by both mass media               
and official state organs." I found this process of enmity-transfer particularly important and             
thought-provoking. In the following subchapters, I elaborate on how enmity-transfer is evident in             
different frames.  
 
In the analyzed materials, the most typical device used for this frame was a testimonial device as                 
journalists quoted the Russian and Ukrainian presidents speaking about shared interests,           
traditions, and ancestors of the two nations. While the pro-Russian President Yanukovych was             
still in power, his rhetorics were naturally in-sync with Putin's, transmitting messages of             
"common roots" and "unity of the two nations". 
 
Extract 1  
Президент России Владимир Путин 
поблагодарил своего украинского коллегу 
Виктора Януковича за возможность 
встречи на этом праздновании 1025-летия 
Крещения Руси в Киеве. 
Russian President Vladimir Putin thanked his 
Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yanukovych, 
for the opportunity to meet at the celebration 
of the 1025th anniversary of the Baptism of 
Rus’ in Kyiv. 
“This joint celebration reminds us of the 
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"Это общий праздник напоминает нам о 
духе единства, общих корнях, о том, что 
много сделано в предыдущем столетии. 
Мы полны решимости, опираясь на то, 
что сделали наши предки, продвигаться 
дальше​,​"​ — обратился он к президенту 
Украины. 
[…] 
Янукович со своей стороны напомнил о 
значимости торжеств. ​"Этот праздник 
свидетельствует о единении наших 
народов.​ Значимость этого праздника 
огромная, и мы приложим все усилия 
хорошо его отметить," — обратился он к 
Путину в начале их беседы. 
[…] 
Он предложил коротко обсудить 
текущую повестку дня переговоров. "У нас 
много взаимных интересов, много 
вопросов, которые бы способствовали 
развитию взаимного сотрудничества двух 
стран в целом ряде отраслей," — добавил 
Янукович. 
spirit of unity, common roots, of how much 
has been done in the previous century. We 
are determined, based on what our ancestors 
have done, to move forward,”​ he addressed 
the President of Ukraine. 
[…]  
Yanukovych for his part reminded about the 
significance of the festivities. "​This holiday 
testifies to the unity of our peoples. ​The 
significance of this holiday is tremendous, 
and we will make every effort to celebrate it 
well," he addressed Putin at the beginning of 
their conversation. 
[…]  
He suggested a brief discussion regarding 
today's agenda. “We have many mutual 
interests, many questions that would 
contribute to the development of mutual 
cooperation between the two countries in a 
number of industries,” Yanukovych added. 
 
(Putin thanked Yanukovych for meeting at the celebrations in Kyiv; 13-8) 
 
Extract 2 
Выступая на торжественном 
мероприятии по случаю совместного 
празднования Дня флота Военно-морского 
флота России и Дня флота Украины, 
Путин отметил: ​“Сегодня в военном 
параде все вы проходите в общем строю, 
знаменуя крепость и преданность 
устоям наших предков, которые веками 
жили вместе, трудились и защищали 
общее Отечество, сделали его могучим, 
великим и непобедимым. У нас общие 
корни, культура и религия. Такая 
общность особенно ощущается в эти 
дни, когда наши страны отмечают 
праздник — 1025-летие Крещения 
Speaking at a ceremony marking the joint 
celebration of the Day of the Fleet of the 
Russian Navy and the Day of the Fleet of 
Ukraine, Putin noted: ​“Today, in a military 
parade, you all go in a common formation, 
showing the strength and devotion to the 
foundations of our ancestors who lived 
together for centuries, worked and defended 
the common Fatherland, made it powerful, 
great and invincible. We have common roots, 
culture and religion. Such unity is especially 
felt these days when our countries celebrate 
a holiday - the 1025th anniversary of the 
Baptism of Holy Rus'. Our blood and 
spiritual bonds are inextricable.” 
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Святой Руси. Наши кровные и духовные 
узы неразрывны.” 
(Vladimir Putin congratulated Russian and Ukrainian sailors; 13-3) 
 
The examples above provide a clear idea about the "unity of the two nations" frame: "the great                 
and invincible common fatherland built by heroic ancestors who shared the same culture and              
religion". However, one detail in those extracts stood out for me. In both Putin's quotes when he                 
speaks about Kievan Rus as a common fatherland, he made the "Rus" salient while always               
omitting the fact it was founded in Kyiv. The idea of unity for the Kremlin is more about                  
influence rather than brotherhood. Nevertheless, this is still a positive frame, the only positive              
frame found in this research. 
 
5.2 The division frame 
"The division frame" is the only frame identified in the materials from both timeframes, 2013               
and 2014. The main message embedded in this frame portrays Ukrainian society being split              
between different ideologies and influenced by various internal and external powers. It is an old               
frame used by the Russian (and some Ukrainian too) public figures and media for whom Ukraine                
has always been divided into "pro-Russian" East and "pro-European" or "nationalist" West.            
However, as the agenda and relationships between the two countries are changing with time, this               
frame has also been evolving. This evolution expands far beyond the period of this research but                
is still clearly visible in the analyzed articles. 
 
This frame may be considered as, what I call, a foundation frame which had set a mental                 
framework for new, more radical frames (e.g. "Donbas is independent" and "Legitimizing            
terrorism" frames in this study). This frame does not merely imply that Ukrainians have different               
views, it polarizes the nation into a pro-Russian group ("the Self") and an opposing group ("the                
Other") which can change depending on the context (e.g. "nationalists" or "pro-western            
liberals"). Thus this frame is crucial for enemy creation: journalists offer the reader two rival               
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groups — one to be associated with and the other, consequently, to denounce. Such practice has                
been widely used in the long history of nationalist ideologies. Zygmund Bauman characterizes             
this phenomenon as 'Gardening state' — an attempt to dictate which groups or ideologies are               
allowed to grow within a particular state or community, and which must be eradicated (Griffin               
2008). 
  
The division frame follows the age-old rule of 'divide et impera', divide and rule, which aims to                 
weaken an opponent by breaking up its powers into pieces. The annexation of Crimea and the                
separatist scenarios in Donbas show that this strategy is fully functional nowadays. It is              
important to note that in 2014, according to Medaisapiens (2016), about 21% of Ukrainians were               
still actively consuming Russian online media. Therefore, the hostility and enemy-creation           
broadcasted by Russian propaganda inevitably had a substantial impact on the views of many              
Ukrainians as well. The division frame, in particular, played a significant role in informational              
campaigns preceding the Russian military operations in Crimea and Donbas by giving the people              
living there a mental framework of belonging and, what is most important — opposition to               
certain real or intentionally fabricated groups within a nation thus splitting and radicalizing the              
society. 
 
Two articles, from 2013 and 2014, had the division frame as dominant: "Victory Day in Ukraine:                
a holiday with tears in the eyes" (13-6) and "Internal War" on [in] Ukraine — Petro Poroshenko                 
as Ukrainian Pinochet" (14-5). Through the analysis of the division frame, I have looked into the                
topics, depictions of the opposing group, and the main idea(s) set in the articles. 
 
"Victory Day in Ukraine: a holiday with tears in the eyes" (13-6) 
In the article 13-6, the division is based around the celebration of the Victory Day. The author                 
compares how the holiday is celebrated in different regions of Ukraine: the West, the East, and                
Crimea. The main idea framed in this article is relatively simple: the inherited Soviet traditions               
of celebrating Victory Day are jeopardized by the increasing activity of nationalists.  
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Extract 3 
Празднования Дня Победы состоятся в 
большинстве городов Украины, но не 
везде. Депутаты двух западных регионов 
объявили 8 и 9 мая "днями скорби". 
Традиционные празднования Дня Победы 
состоятся в большинстве городов 
Украины, но не везде. ​Страна 
по-прежнему расколота надвое, и 
накануне 9 мая это становится 
особенно заметно​: в прошлые годы 
праздник омрачали различные инциденты, 
связанные с попытками националистов на 
западе страны помешать торжествам. 
Недобрая традиция. 
[…] 
Потасовки, словесные оскорбления и 
драки в День Победы — для Украины не 
новость. В 2011 году, во время 
масштабных беспорядков во Львове, 
слышалась даже стрельба из 
травматического оружия — и не в 
качестве праздничного салюта. Тогда 
десятки радикальных националистов из 
движения "Свобода" не пускали ветеранов 
и жителей города к военному кладбищу на 
Холме Славы. […] 
Между тем, на востоке Украины, власти 
Харькова обратились в конце апреля к 
правоохранителям с просьбой защитить 
от надругательств памятники войны на 
территории города. ​Городской совет 
утверждает, что "радикально 
настроенные шовинисты, исповедующие 
фашистские ценности", собираются 
начертить свастику на памятниках 
участникам Великой Отечественной 
войны, якобы с целью отомстить за 
снос памятного камня, заложенного в 
честь "Украинской повстанческой 
армии", которая воевала против 
Красной Армии. ​[…] 
Совместный парад российских и 
Victory Day celebrations will take place in 
most cities of Ukraine, but not everywhere. 
Deputies of the two western regions declared 
May 8 and 9 "the days of sorrow." 
Traditional Victory Day celebrations will take 
place in most cities of Ukraine, but not 
everywhere. ​The country is still split in two, 
and on the eve of May 9, this becomes 
especially noticeable:​ in past years, the 
holiday was overshadowed by various 
incidents related to attempts of nationalists in 
the west of the country to interfere with the 
celebrations. 
Bad tradition. 
[…] 
Brawls, verbal abuse, and fights on Victory 
Day are typical news for Ukraine. ​In 2011, 
during large-scale riots in Lviv, even shots 
from traumatic weapons were heard — and 
not as a festive salute.​ Then, dozens of 
radical nationalists from the movement 
"Svoboda" did not let veterans and citizens 
enter the military cemetery on the Hill of 
Glory. 
[…] 
Meanwhile, in eastern Ukraine, the Kharkiv 
authorities requested law enforcement to 
protect war monuments in the city from abuse 
in late April. ​The city council claims that 
"radical chauvinists professing fascist 
values" are going to draw a swastika on the 
monuments to participants of the Great 
Patriotic War, supposedly to avenge the 
demolition of the memorial stone laid in 
honor of the "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" 
which fought against the Red Army. 
[…] 
The joint parade of Russian and Ukrainian 
sailors in Sevastopol, where the main forces 
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet are based, for 
several years in a row has become the biggest 
celebration event on Victory Day in Ukraine. 
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украинских моряков в Севастополе, где 
базируются основные силы Черноморского 
флота России, уже несколько лет подряд 
становится самым массовым на Украине 
праздничным мероприятием в День 
Победы. За прохождением колонн, в 
которых военнослужащие российского и 
украинского флотов идут плечом к плечу, 
наблюдают от 30 до 50 тысяч человек. 
From 30 to 50 thousand people observe the 
passage of convoys in which service members 
of the Russian and Ukrainian fleets go 
shoulder to shoulder. 
(Victory Day in Ukraine: a holiday with tears in the eyes; 13-6) 
 
The author uses card-stacking and name-calling techniques to highlight the growing tension in             
society. The East of Ukraine and Crimea (the pro-Russian group in this article) are resisting "​the                
prohibitions of Soviet symbols and the aggressive rhetorics of nationalists​" while the West of the               
country (the opposing group in this article) is troubled with fights and riots. The author brings up                 
some conflict stories from the past (2011 and 2012), as well as some vague claims of a city                  
council preparing to possible acts of vandalism by "​radical chauvinists professing fascist            
values​," to magnify the hostility and attach negative labels to the westerners and Ukrainian              
nationalists. Meanwhile, thousands of people in Crimea are appreciating the Russian and            
Ukrainian fleets "​going shoulder to shoulder​" — the unity of the two nations frame is used here                 
as a secondary frame to solidify the affiliation of this group with "the Russian Self." 
 
"Internal War" on [in] Ukraine — Petro Poroshenko as Ukrainian Pinochet" (14-5) 
The article 14-5 has a much more complex structure than the previous example from 2013. This                
article is built around the division frame. It provides not one but many angles on the                
confrontation rifts and opposing groups in the country showing that the newly-elected President             
Poroshenko is not in control, he navigates the chaos with force "​relying on the punitive               
battalions and the block of Nazis and fascists.​" 
 
Extract 4 
Несмотря на провозглашение Порошенко 
президентом, на Украине до сих пор нет 
Despite the proclamation of Poroshenko as 
president, Ukraine still does not have a single 
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единого центра управления, ее «элиту» 
раздирают внутренние противоречия. 
Политические разломы, на краю которых 
балансирует Порошенко, как 
потенциальный правитель пиночетовского 
типа, углубляются как в самом Киеве, так 
и между столицей и регионами. 
Политические разломы проходят: 
 
Между сторонниками «февральской 
революции» и ​людьми, не приемлющими 
«нового украинского порядка». То есть 
ополченцами Донбасса, 
отстаивающими свои права с оружием в 
руках, гражданским населением и 
политиками, включая депутатов 
Верховной рады, придерживающимися 
антифашистских взглядов. 
control center; its “elite” is torn by internal 
contradictions. Political rifts, on the edge of 
which Poroshenko balances, as a potential 
ruler of the Pinochet type, are deepening both 
in Kyiv itself and between the capital and the 
regions. 
Political rifts pass between: 
 
Between supporters of the “February 
revolution” and ​people who do not accept the 
“new Ukrainian order.” That is the rebels of 
Donbas defending their rights with guns in 
their hands; civilians and politicians, 
including members of Parliament, who hold 
anti-fascist views. 
 
(Internal War" on [in] Ukraine - Petro Poroshenko as Ukrainian Pinochet; 14-5) 
 
The extract above shows how polarizing the article is. It also lists some of the confronting groups                 
framed with a variety of propaganda devices. Overall, a number of confrontation rifts are              
highlighted in this publication. They are dividing the country into the following groups: the              
supporters and opponents of the Euromaidan revolution; civilians and politicians "holding           
anti-fascist views"; different regions and consequently the oligarchs representing those regions.           
It is worth taking a closer look at the first four of the listed opposing groups, how they are                   
framed to create enemy images, and what devices are used for that.  
 
The Euromaidan revolution, which led to an escape of the pro-Russian President Yanukovych,             
was a pivotal point in Russo-Ukrainian relationships. The Kremlin perceived the Ukrainian            
revolution not only as a diplomatic defeat and loss of influence in the region but also as a bad                   
example for Russian citizens and a threat to Putin's reign. Therefore, the Euromaidan has been               
heavily targeted by Russian propaganda with disinformation, hate speech, and enemy framing.  
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In the article 14-5, the split around the Euromaidan presents the following opposing groups. The               
Pro-revolution group (anti-Russian), which includes the President Poroshenko and the new           
government, Ukrainian citizens, the USA and the UK as agents of influence that are "curating"               
the new Ukrainian leaders. The anti-revolution group (pro-Russian), which includes armed           
separatists in Donbas and members of Parliament, " ​who hold anti-fascist views​". 
 
In his expressions, the author dramatically deviates from objective reality to appeal to his              
audience emotionally. He uses the glittering generalities device for framing the anti-revolution            
group. In his words, Russia-backed armed forces in Ukraine become "​people who do not accept               
the "new Ukrainian order". That is the rebels of Donbas defending their rights with guns in their                 
hands​." Then he calls the pro-Russian MPs "​anti-fascists​" to attach a repeatedly used archetype              
of "​fascists​" to the rest of the post-revolutionary parliament. When it comes to framing the               
pro-revolution group, there are more devices involved and it is worth highlighting them with              
some examples from the text. 
 
The Transfer device. ​The whole article 14-5 is built around the analogy comparing President              
Poroshenko to Augusto Pinochet. The analogy suggests particular meanings: to show           
Poroshenko as a cruel dictator and to suggest that the Euromaidan was nothing but a coup                
planned and curated by the USA.  
 
Extract 5 
Благодаря этим людям Порошенко 
действует в логике Пиночета, сумевшего 
сходным образом со временем 
сосредоточить в своих руках всю полноту 
власти, устранив конкурентов. [...] 
Наиболее действенный инструментарий 
«украинского Пиночета»: «эскадроны 
смерти»​, то есть парамилитаристские 
формирования так называемой 
«национальной гвардии», батальоны 
олигархата – «Днепр», «Донбасс», 
силовики спецслужб типа «Альфы» СБУ и 
Thanks to these people, Poroshenko acts in 
the logic of Pinochet, who similarly managed 
to concentrate in his hands the fullness of 
power, eliminating competitors. [...]  
The most effective tool of the “Ukrainian 
Pinochet”: “death squads”​, i.e., paramilitary 
units of the so-called “national guard”, 
oligarchy battalions - “Dnipro”, “Donbas”, 
security forces of the “Alpha” security 
services of the SSU and special forces of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, mercenaries of 
foreign private military companies. [...]  
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спецподразделений МВД, наемники 
иностранных частных военных компаний. 
[...]  
Управлять голодным и мерзнущим 
населением можно ​только​ ​с помощью 
террора, проводимого карательным 
механизмом, превращающим всю 
силовую группировку в стальной кулак 
полицейского режима пиночетовского 
типа. ​[...]  
Порошенко, в отличие от Коломойского и 
Тимошенко, собственных вооруженных 
формирований пока не имеет. ​Он 
опирается на армию и блок нацистов и 
фашистов, взращенный спецслужбами 
через 
Наливайченко-Смешко-Скипальского-Гриц
енко-Яроша. ​Их основная задача – 
превращение Украины в плацдарм войны 
против России. Разведслужбы играют 
при Порошенко, как и при Пиночете, 
значительную роль уже с первых 
месяцев репрессий и уничтожения 
инакомыслящих.  
Managing a hungry and freezing population 
is possible only ​with the help of terror, 
carried out by a punitive mechanism that 
turns the entire force group into a steel fist 
of the Pinochet-type police regime. ​[...] 
Poroshenko, unlike Kolomoisky and 
Tymoshenko, does not yet have its own armed 
forces. ​He relies on the army and the block 
of Nazis and fascists, nurtured by the secret 
services​ through 
Nalivaichenko-Smeshko-Skipalsky-Gritsenko-
Yarosh.​ Their main task is to turn Ukraine 
into a bridgehead of the war against Russia. 
Intelligence services play under Poroshenko, 
as well as under Pinochet, a significant role 
already from the first months of repression 
and the destruction of dissidents. 
(Internal War" on [in] Ukraine - Petro Poroshenko as Ukrainian Pinochet; 14-5) 
 
Name-calling device. ​It is evident from the extract above that the author is not shy to use quite                  
extreme expressions for characterizing the Ukrainian military in particular: "battalions of           
punishers; block of Nazis and fascists; death squads". As mentioned before, the archetype of              
Nazis and fascists has a strong emotional weight for the Russian audience and is repeatedly used                
in this article as well as in propagandist publications in general. These two terms are used                
interchangeably without any logical attachments — only the emotional ones. 
 
The card-stacking device ​is embodied in every paragraph of the article as it has several               
dominant frames and a highly manipulative narrative. In addition to the division frame, there are               
also "Independence of Donbas" and "The USA as a chaos curator" dominant frames present in               
this article. The following extract provides quite a remarkable example of card-stacking. In this              
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passage, all the dominant frames are emerging into one main idea — the audience frame (Figure                
3) that the author has planted in this article. Firstly, this idea implies that the armed conflict in                  
Donbas is beneficial to the Ukrainian leaders as it allows them to ​"redirect the energy of                
discontent" that is growing in the country to an external enemy. Secondly, it implies that the                
Kremlin is being "provoked" to be involved in this conflict by the USA because if it were not,                  
not only Ukraine would get Donbas and Crimea back but would go further and invade a number                 
of regions in Russia.  
 
Extract 6 
Причины, вынуждающие действовать 
именно так, обусловлены экономическими 
и внешнеполитическими факторами. В 
первом случае ​внутриукраинские 
противоречия между олигархами и 
населением не устранимы в принципе, 
поэтому энергию недовольства удобнее 
перенаправить на внешнего врага.​ Во 
втором – ​втягивание России в конфликт 
необходимо американским кураторам 
«Наливайченко и Ко». Этапы, они же 
предлоги для провоцирования Кремля: 
«освобождение» Донбасса, затем Крыма, 
к границе которого Киев с 10 июля 
стягивает тяжелую боевую технику, и, 
наконец, Курской, Липецкой, 
Воронежской и других, по мнению 
Яроша-Тягнибока, «исконно украинских 
земель». 
The reasons for acting in this way are due to 
economic and foreign policy factors. In the 
first case, ​the internal Ukrainian disputes 
between the oligarchs and the population 
cannot be eliminated at all; therefore, it is 
more convenient to redirect the energy of 
discontent to an external enemy.​ In the 
second, ​the involvement of Russia in the 
conflict is necessary for the American 
curators of "Nalyvaichenko and Co." The 
stages, i.e., the pretexts for provoking the 
Kremlin: the "liberation" of the Donbas, 
then the Crimea, to the border of which Kyiv 
has been pulling together heavy military 
equipment since July 10, and, finally, 
according to Yarosh-Tyagnibok, Kursk, 
Lipetsk, Voronezh, and others, "primordially 
Ukrainian lands". 
(Internal War" on [in] Ukraine - Petro Poroshenko as Ukrainian Pinochet; 14-5) 
 
5.3 Donbas is independent — legitimizing terrorism 
"Independence of Donbas" and "Legitimizing terrorism" are two closely related frames that are             
often used together. They are the most common frames of this study, identified in various               
combinations in 7 out of 8 articles of the 2014 period. This subchapter provides a closer look at                  
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those combinations, as well as the main ideas that authors try to transmit using these frames, and                 
the devices they use to do it.  
 
The common purpose of these two frames is to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the                
Ukrainian post-Euromaidan government and the president. "The independence of Donbas” frame           
does it by recognizing the self-proclaimed separatist republics of "DPR" and "LPR" (also called              
jointly as "Novorossiya") as independent states and making it look natural as if these formations               
have always been there. "The legitimizing terrorism" frame does it by providing a media              
platform for the leaders of the self-proclaimed republics, using their information as a single              
source of truth, making their perspective salient while criticizing or omitting the perspective of              
Ukrainian authorities.  
 
When it comes to reporting news about the conflict in Donbas, the analyzed media use these two                 
frames by default simply because they reflect the Kremlin's position on this topic. The article               
14-1 is one of many (e.g., 14-2; 14-3; 14-4; 14-5; 14-7;14-8) online publications that amplify the                
separatists' agenda of enmity and hostility towards Ukraine. 
 
Extract 7 
Народный губернатор ДНР Губарев 
предъявил новый ультиматум киевским 
властям. 
 
Лидер Донецкой народной республики 
Павел Губарев предъявил новый 
ультиматум киевским властям. Он заявил, 
что ​если в течение ближайшего часа 
войска и военная техника не будут 
выведены с территории ДНР, они будут 
уничтожены силами ополченцев. 
 
«Остаётся 1 час до истечения 
ультиматума украинским оккупантам, 
чтобы они сняли незаконные блокпосты 
и увели войска и технику от городов 
People's Governor of the DPR Gubarev 
presented a new ultimatum to the Kyiv 
authorities. 
 
The leader of the Donetsk People's Republic, 
Pavel Gubarev, presented a new ultimatum to 
the Kyiv authorities. He stated that​ if troops 
and military equipment were not withdrawn 
from the territory of the DPR within the next 
hour, they would be destroyed by the rebel 
forces. 
 
"One hour remains before the ultimatum 
expires for the Ukrainian invaders to remove 
illegal checkpoints and withdraw troops and 
equipment from the cities of Donbas. 
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Донбасса. В противном случае – 
тотальное уничтожение всех: и 
техники, и живой силы фашистов!​» - 
написал он в Facebook. 
Otherwise, the total destruction of all: both 
equipment and manpower of the fascists!" 
he wrote on Facebook. 
 
(People's Governor of the DPR Gubarev presented a new ultimatum to the Kyiv authorities;              
14-1) 
 
In the extract above, the media provide a platform for hate speech, broadcasting enemy images               
of "fascists" and "invaders" (name-calling and transfer devices), and attaching them to            
Ukrainians. At the same time, the author portrays Gubarev as a hero, "People's Governor"              
(glittering generalities technique). The self-proclaimed separatist formation "DPR" is framed as a            
legitimate, recognized country with its pompous titles like "People's Governor". The reader gets             
the idea that this "country" has existed in Donbas for ages until its existence got threatened by                 
the "invasion" of Ukrainian "fascists". 
 
The above-mentioned propaganda devices are the ones typically used to facilitate the            
"Independence of Donbas" and "Legitimizing terrorism" frames. The name-calling device is           
applied to Ukraine to call it a "killer-country" or a "junta" (14-5; 14-7); Ukrainian soldiers are                
described as "punishers", "invaders", "forcers" and "fascists" (examples are present in all articles             
of 2014). By contrast, the glittering generalities device is applied to the pro-Russian separatists.              
They are typically called "people's rebellion" or simply "rebels" (ibid.) implying that the Russian              
Federation has no involvement in establishing, supporting and effectively controlling the “DPR”            
and “LPR” which has been proved wrong numerous times by various respected international             
institutions (e.g., PACE 2016; International Court of Justice 2019). This implication is another             
central idea promoted by the Independence of Donbas frame — in addition to undermining              
Ukrainian authorities, it also denies Russia's involvement in this conflict.  
 
One particular device is distinctive for the Independence of Donbas frame. This technique is not               
identified in previous research (e.g., Pan & Kosicki 1993 or Miller 1937). Instead, the device was                
inductively found in the data, and I have named it "Grammatical separatism". It works by               
manipulating with prepositions. In the Russian language, the preposition "на" [in English, “on”]             
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is used for territories and regions (e.g., на территории, на Закарпатье) while the preposition "в"               
[in English, “in”] is used with countries or cities (e.g. в Германии, в Москве). In some of the                  
analyzed articles, the authors use the preposition "на" [on] with Ukraine (e.g., 13-2; 13-6; 14-4;               
14-5) subtly undermining its independence and addressing it as one of the regions of the fallen                
USSR. In article 14-4, the author also uses the preposition "в" [in] with Donbas, which normally,                
as a region, would be addressed with the "на" preposition. Thus, the author authorizes the idea of                 
the independence of Donbas by distorting grammar. 
 
5.4 The USA as the ultimate enemy 
The Cold War has turned the USA and Russia into arch-enemies. The Kremlin has been               
nurturing the enemy images of the USA and everything American for decades. Anti-western             
narratives have been a prominent feature of Russian political and media discourses years before              
the conflict in Ukraine (e.g., Hutching and Szostek 2016; Smyth and Soboleva 2014: 257-275;              
Yablokov 2014: 622-636). However, I was not expecting to find this frame within this study               
simply because the research is focused on relationships between Russia and Ukraine, not Russia              
and the USA. However, the frame of the USA as the ultimate enemy is vividly present in the                  
materials of 2014.  
 
Three articles (14-4;14-5;14-6) frame the United States and President Obama personally as            
terrorists and the organizers of the war in Ukraine (to harm Russia). In article 14-4, the author                 
compares President Poroshenko to President Obama as the agents of evil, but on a different               
scale: ​"Like Obama in regards to the entire planet, Poroshenko also got disrespect, only adjusted               
to his own geographical and political insignificance." Then he uses the "plain folks technique"              
by replying to the president's statement with provocative fictional responses from "the people"             
(Extract 8). The following extract is an example of a bland propagandist manipulation by              
appealing to the reader's emotions, using syntactic, rhetoric, and thematic structures. 
 
Extract 8 
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Как и у Обамы по отношению ко всей 
планете, у Порошенко тоже 
пренебрежение, только с поправкой на 
собственную географическую и 
политическую незначительность​. Тот о 
военном вмешательстве в дела других 
стран – этот о войне с другим Донбассом. 
Тот об альтернативных инструментах 
воздействия – этот о неких мирных 
инициативах. Тот о мировом лидерстве 
США – этот о всепобеждающем 
украинском национализме. 
У Порошенко это было торжество 
недосказанности. В его специально для 
цитирования рубленых фразах отрубили и 
выбросили главное. ​“Наши условия – 
отсутствие потерь среди мирного 
населения”, – говорит он. “Не 
выполнены”, – уточняют 
уничтоженные и безлюдные города 
юго-востока. “Наша победа 
неотвратима, поскольку это наша 
армия на нашей территории”, – грезит 
он. “Убивает наших людей”, – 
дополняют мирные граждане Донбасса. 
“Мы способны принести мир на 
украинскую землю”, – медитирует он. 
“Предварительно опустошив ее”, – 
добавляют те, кого уже вынудили эту 
землю покинуть. 
Like Obama in regards to the entire planet, 
Poroshenko also got disrespect, only 
adjusted to his own geographical and 
political insignificance​. The one is about 
military intervention in the affairs of other 
countries - the other is about the war with 
another Donbas. The one is about alternative 
tools of influence - the other is about some 
peace initiatives. The one is about US world 
leadership - the other is about all-conquering 
Ukrainian nationalism. 
Poroshenko had that triumph of an 
understatement. In his, specially-made for 
quoting, chopped phrases, the main thing was 
chopped off and thrown away. ​"Our 
conditions are the absence of casualties 
among the civilian population," he says. 
"Not fulfilled," the destroyed and deserted 
cities of the southeast specify. "Our victory is 
inevitable because it is our army on our 
territory," he dreams. "Kills our people," - 
civilians of Donbas add. "We are able to 
bring peace to Ukrainian soil," he meditates. 
"By preliminarily emptying it," add those 
who have already been forced to leave this 
land. 
(Punitive peacekeeping. President of Ukraine declared war; 14-4) 
 
In the above cited article, as well as in article 14-5 about the "Ukrainian Pinochet" (examined in                 
subchapter 5.2), the authors transfer and reinforce the well-rooted enemy images of the USA              
onto Ukraine. By doing so, propagandists help the reader find some rationale in this sudden               
change of attitude: what was a partner and a "brother nation" a year ago, now is a "Ukrainian                  
junta" — why? Americans must be the reason behind it. 
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Another idea supported by this frame is that the USA has planned the revolution in Kyiv and the                  
war in Donbas to provoke Russia, force it to get involved in the conflict so the US could find the                    
reasons to impose sanctions against Russia and weaken its economy (e.g., extracts 6 and 9). In                
the article 14-6 (Extract 9), the author uses the transfer device by attaching the terrorist stigmas                
to the USA and President Obama to create a "geopolitical monster ​Al-USA" led by "Obama Bin                
Laden". The author uses a mix of rhetorical and thematic structures to create an emotional image                
of the United States using Ukraine as a tool in order to impose sanctions on Russia and "​clear the                   
space for American companies​": ​"Let's say Bush needed a bottle of flour to destroy Iraq. Obama                
already needed Ukraine to try to do the same with Russia" (Extract 9).  
 
An interesting point in the extract below addresses the idea of being proud to get sanctions                
imposed against you: ​"Sanctions mean that we are truly worth something." This sentiment             
reflects the campaign span by Russian propaganda in response to the sanctions imposed by the               
US and the EU. "Topol [missile system] is not afraid of sanctions" and "Sanctions? Don’t make                
my Iskander [missile system] laugh" were one of the statements used in this campaign. In Extract                
9, the author reinforces the message that Russia's involvement in the war in Ukraine is               
completely justified even though it may undermine the economy due to sanctions. 
 
Extract 9 
Спасибо Майдану. Открыл истинное лицо 
президента США. ​Знакомьтесь, Обама 
Бен Ладен. Кажется, что он способен 
появиться везде. Может уничтожить 
покой в любой точке мира. И ему для 
этого совсем не нужны бомбы или 
начиненные смертниками самолеты. 
Санкции — это его оружие массового 
поражения. ​Это не отдельный теракт. 
Это — повсеместный террор. Или, по 
крайней мере, заявка на него. Он не 
взрывает небоскребы, станции метро, 
поезда или вокзалы. Он метит в основу, 
бьет по устоям, разрушает порядки, 
делает больно всем.  
Thanks Maidan. Revealed the true face of the 
US President. ​Meet, Obama Bin Laden. He 
seems capable of appearing everywhere. He 
can destroy peace anywhere in the world. 
And he doesn't need bombs or suicide 
bombers to do that. Sanctions are his 
weapons of mass destruction. ​This is not a 
separate terrorist attack. This is widespread 
terror. Or at least an attempt on it. He does 
not explode skyscrapers, subway stations, 
trains or train stations. He targets the core, 
hits the foundation, destroys orders, makes 
everyone hurt. 
If it does not help - then the good-old methods 
of converting the disobedient into their faith. 
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Если не помогает — тогда старые добрые 
методы обращения непокорных в свою 
веру. ​В Сирии уже не разберешь, где 
Аль-Каида, где США. Там окончательно 
сформировался новый геополитический 
монстр под названием Аль-США. ​Он 
угрожает своим "джихадом" всем, кто 
даже не мешает, а просто живет своей 
жизнью. В мире скоро не останется 
стран, которые в той или иной степени не 
подверглись бы атаке американских 
принципов.  
Это, конечно, придумал не Обама. Но при 
нем это приобрело неприличные формы. 
Скажем, Бушу для уничтожения Ирака 
понадобился флакончик с мукой. Обаме, 
чтобы попробовать сделать то же 
самое с Россией, уже понадобилась 
Украина.  
[...] 
Санкции — это значит, что мы, правда, 
чего-то стоим. Обама, по сути, 
"санкционирует" признание.​ Хотя вряд 
ли, конечно, мы нуждались именно в такой 
его форме. Но терроризм лишен логики, 
правил, морали. У него есть только 
мотивация. Запугать, подчинить, 
уничтожить. ​В США надеются таким 
примитивным способом еще и 
расчистить пространство для своих 
компаний. Рынок вооружений, например, 
без "Калашникова" заметно оскудеет. 
Но в Соединенных Штатах, наверняка, 
уже знают, как его разнообразить. Это 
называется недобросовестной 
конкуренцией.  
In Syria, one could no longer tell where Al 
Qaeda ends and where the United States 
starts. A new geopolitical monster called 
Al-USA was formed there decisively. ​It 
threatens its "jihad" to anyone who does not 
even interfere but simply lives his life. There 
will soon be no countries in the world that 
are, to one degree or another, not attacked by 
American principles. 
This, of course, was not invented by Obama. 
But with him, it took obscene forms. ​Let's say 
Bush needed a bottle of flour to destroy Iraq. 
Obama already needed Ukraine to try to do 
the same with Russia. 
[...] 
Sanctions mean that we are truly worth 
something. Obama, in fact, "sanctions" the 
recognition.​ Although hardly, of course, we 
needed it in this form. But terrorism is devoid 
of logic, rules, morals. It has only one 
motivation. To intimidate, subjugate, destroy. 
In the US, they also hope to clear the space 
for their companies in such a primitive way. 
The arms market, for example, without 
Kalashnikov, will noticeably scarce. But in 
the United States, they probably already 
know how to diversify it. This is called unfair 
competition. 
 
(Obama Bin Laden. The USA hit Russia right in the "sector"; 14-6) 
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5.5 Framing the post-truth reality 
In addition to the highlighted frames, the example above (Extract 9) evidently illustrates how              
online media create and spread misinformation and conspiracy theories to create a bubble of              
alternative reality for their audience. The idea of the USA curating the revolution in Kyiv,               
highlighted in extract 9, was at the core of a popular conspiracy theory spun by Russian media.                 
The threat of such activity is more significant than it may seem. Even though other media and                 
NGOs are actively exposing disinformation and manipulation broadcasted through the          
propagandist networks, those efforts rarely lead to bursting the bubble of alternative reality             
simply because the audience is comfortable being inside of that bubble. As Lewandowsky and              
Cook (2017:11) put it: ​"The post-truth problem is not a blemish on the mirror [that can be                 
cleared up with a suitable corrective disinfectant]. The problem is that the mirror is a window                
into an alternative reality." This subchapter presents some of the examples of frames that              
notably exploit misinformation and conspiracy theories to fuel the post-truth machine. 
 
Extract 10 provides an example of the "Ukrainian misery" frame evident in five articles (14-2;               
14-4; 14-5; 14-7; 14-8), mostly as a secondary frame supporting the main messages with the               
background picture of suffering Ukrainians emerged in the chaos and "managed by terror".             
Important to point out that this distorted sad picture of the "hungry and freezing population" is                
applied not to the warzone regions but the whole nation. As extract 10 shows, this frame is                 
lacking any logic or evidence and appeals purely to emotions or the reader reinforcing the enemy                
image towards the "punitive regime" in Ukraine. 
 
Extract 10 
Главный враг режима — не 
«сепаратисты» Донбасса, а собственное 
многомиллионное население, которое 
нужно кормить. Делать это все сложнее 
– с учетом углубляющегося 
экономического кризиса и 
деиндустриализации. В этих условиях 
The main enemy of the regime is not the 
“separatists” of Donbas, but their own 
[Ukrainian] multimillion population, which 
needs to be fed. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult to do this, given the deepening 
economic crisis and decentralization. Under 
these conditions, the army also turns into an 
52 
 
армия также превращается в 
инструмент внутренней, а не внешней 
политики. Управлять голодным и 
мерзнущим населением можно только с 
помощью террора, проводимого 
карательным механизмом, превращающим 
всю силовую группировку в стальной кулак 
полицейского режима пиночетовского 
типа. 
instrument of domestic rather than foreign 
policy. Managing a hungry and freezing 
population is possible only with the help of 
terror, carried out by a punitive mechanism 
that turns the entire force group into a steel 
fist of the Pinochet-type police regime. 
(Internal War" on [in] Ukraine - Petro Poroshenko as Ukrainian Pinochet; 14-5) 
 
After the MH17 catastrophe over the sky of Donbas, the propagandist media started spreading              
conspiracy theories about who downed the plane. Extract 11 is an example of framing Kyiv               
being responsible for downing the Boeing. The author uses card stacking, rhetorical and thematic              
manipulations, citing some "American expert" to build a believable theory blaming Ukraine for             
downing the plane with the Buk missile system. The official investigation (Dutch Ministry of              
Foreign Affairs 2018) has debunked this theory since the Buk system that shot the plane actually                
belongs to the Russian army and was used by the separatists. However, the way the author of the                  
article 14-7 operates various details from different (not necessarily reliable) sources make this             
theory seem pretty solid. 
 
Extract 11 
Возвращение Путина из сверхудачного 
латиноамериканского турне. Новые 
санкции США, с треском проваленные 
Евросоюзом. Военные успехи ополченцев. 
Все так некстати складывалось не в 
пользу хунты и ее покровителей. Из этого 
еще ничего не следует. ​Но тот, между 
прочим, американский, эксперт который 
первым сказал, что именно Киев мог 
быть заинтересован в этой 
катастрофе, наверное, взвесил все "за" и 
"против". Есть факты. С одной 
Putin's return from a highly successful Latin 
American tour. New US sanctions failed 
miserably by the European Union. Military 
successes of the rebels. Everything was going 
so much not in favor of the junta and its 
patrons. Nothing yet follows from this. ​But 
one, by the way, American expert who was 
the first to say that it was Kyiv that could be 
interested in this disaster, probably weighed 
all the pros and cons. There are facts. On the 
one hand, Ukraine just the day before [the 
downing of MH17] relocated the Buk missile 
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стороны, Украина как раз накануне 
передислоцировала ракетные "Буки", 
способные бить по таким верхам из-под 
Харькова в Донецк. По данным 
министерства обороны России, Боинг 
сбили именно в зоне поражения их 
комплексов. 
launchers, capable of hitting such heights, 
from near Kharkiv to Donetsk. According to 
the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Boeing 
was shot down precisely in the strike zone of 
their systems. 
(Useless zone. Ukraine has officially become a "black hole"; 14-7) 
 
Another frame from article 14-7 reflects the essence of the post-truth world by framing the idea                
that one's opinion prevails over facts: "no matter what experts and politicians, upright or not,               
would assume now, until finding out the true reasons, everyone will still draw conclusions by               
virtue of their sympathies and interests. And after, apparently, too." Here propagandist uses the              
bandwagon technique by applying the peer-pressure to impose this idea on the reader. Later in               
the same paragraph, the journalist uses the MH17 crash as a leverage to create an enemy image                 
of "Ukrainian punishers exterminating people purposefully, including women and children." 
 
Extract 12 
Впрочем, что бы сейчас ни 
предполагали эксперты и политики, 
добросовестные или нет, до выяснения 
истинных причин каждый все равно 
будет делать выводы в силу своих 
симпатий и заинтересованности. И 
после, видимо, тоже. ​Одно бесспорно. 
Массовое убийство — это всегда страшно. 
Но на Донбассе люди гибли и до Боинга и, 
что самое ужасное, будут гибнуть и после 
него. ​И, если в самолет хотя бы 
теоретически могли попасть случайно, 
то на этой земле, в том числе, женщин и 
детей украинские каратели истребляют 
целенаправленно.  
However, no matter what experts and 
politicians, upright or not, would assume 
now, until finding out the true reasons, 
everyone will still draw conclusions by 
virtue of their sympathies and interests. 
And after, apparently, too.​ One thing is 
certain. Mass kill is always scary. But in the 
Donbas, people died before the Boeing 
[MH17] and, worst of all, they will die after 
it.​ And while the plane, at least 
theoretically, could have been hit by 
accident, on this land, Ukrainian punishers 
exterminate people purposefully, including 
women and children. 
(Useless zone. Ukraine has officially become a "black hole"; 14-7) 
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6 Discussion 
This study aimed to assess the language manipulation efforts of the Russian state-funded online              
media in their news and analytical publications on Ukraine. It was designed to answer three               
research questions: RQ1. How do language choices in analyzed Russian media invite the             
audience to perceive Ukraine and Ukrainians? RQ2. How does the framing of stories about              
Ukraine in the analyzed Russian media change after the Euromaidan revolution? RQ3. Can the              
analyzed articles be recognized as a product of propaganda? 
 
In the previous chapter, the strategic and tactical levels of enemy-image framing were analyzed.              
The discussion section combines the two levels above into a coherent outline, addresses the              
research questions, provides an overview of the theoretical contribution of this study, as well as               
its critical evaluation, challenges, and future research recommendations. 
 
6.1 Key Findings and Theoretical Contribution 
By thoroughly addressing the research questions, this study has found that the analyzed Russian              
media have considerably changed the narratives of their news and analytical publications on             
Ukraine after the Euromaidan revolution. In contrast to generally neutral articles from 2013, the              
publications from 2014 were portraying Ukraine as a threat to Russia, the new Ukrainian              
Government as a cruel dictatorship controlled by the US, dehumanizing and undermining            
Ukrainian authorities while romanticizing and legitimizing the armed separatists in the warzone            
of Donbas. One thing that stayed consistent before and after the government change in Ukraine is                
the alignment of the analyzed media narratives with the Kremlin's political agenda. This             
alignment, combined with omnipresent misinformation, reinforcement of conspiracy theories,         
aggressive enmity framing using propaganda techniques, suggests that the analyzed media           
organizations de-facto function as extensions of a centralized body of state propaganda. 
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Even though in the majority, this study has generated anticipated findings, some surprises and              
challenges also appeared in the process of the research, which, however, only added depth to its                
outcomes. The working hypothesis that the discourse on Ukraine has changed dramatically in the              
analyzed media after the Euromaidan revolution in Kyiv was confirmed. The materials from the              
2013 period were more neutral in their judgment and language; the framing of the stories was                
mostly positive, displaying the affinity and shared history of the neighboring states. However,             
even those seemingly positive publications about the unity of the two nations were transmitting              
the Kremlin's post-imperialist agenda. The central element of this agenda is the Freudian "Self"              
that positions Russia as a victorious heir of the Soviet Empire that defeated Nazism.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3 by scholars like Steuter and Wills (2009), and Vuorinen (2012), the                
nurturing of the Self is essential for enemy creation because, in order to oppose a group, one has                  
to belong to another group in the first place. This opposition becomes evident through the               
"division frame" already in the materials from 2013 and grows into a full-scale enmity in 2014.                
The division frame was vital for Russia's hybrid war scenario because it is not an old-fashioned                
invasion to fight enemies — it is an "invasion to protect friends." The propaganda had been                
nurturing the idea of the pro-Russian "Self" in the South-East of Ukraine long before the conflict.                
So after the Euromaidan, all it took to justify Russian military intrusion in Crimea and later in                 
Donbas was creating an image of that "Self" being in danger. As Katchanovski (2016: 85) puts                
it:  
"Russian leaders and the media often characterized the overthrow of Yanukovych as a fascist              
coup, and they justified support of separatism and annexation of Crimea by the protection of               
ethnic Russians from the Ukrainian 'fascists'."  
 
One of the long-standing dilemmas that have pushed me to conduct this investigation was              
understanding how Russian propaganda was able to switch its narratives about Ukraine so             
rapidly. In a matter of months, even weeks, what had been before a brother-nation with ​"common                
roots, culture, and religion"​, suddenly has become a ​"junta" ruled by ​"the block of Nazis and                
fascists." How is it possible to shift the course of public opinion so dramatically and get                
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much-needed people's support for the military interventions in a neighboring country? The            
answer I found through this research was, what I call, ​"an enmity transfer"​. This concept is based                 
on a transfer propaganda device (Miller 1937) defined by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis              
(IPA) back in 1937. It works by associating a targeted group or a person (the Other) with existing                  
enemy images. This manipulation expands the negativity from existing enemy images and            
attaches it to the targeted group or a person. It is usually conducted by combining different                
syntactic, rhetoric, and thematic framing techniques. As a result, yesterday's friend starts to             
resemble today's enemy and deserves to be fought against tomorrow. 
 
In the context of this study, Russian propaganda transferred primarily two existing enemy images              
to create a new one around Ukraine: the Nazis (or fascists) from World War II, and the USA (or                   
the West in general) from the Cold War. As was mentioned before, anti-American narratives              
have always been a part of the Russian political and media agenda (e.g., Hutching & Szostek                
2016). However, such a strong presence of this theme within this investigation was not              
anticipated. Nonetheless, this surprise turned out to be one of the key insights of this research                
and provides a possibility to examine the enemy creation process as a larger entity. Figure 4 is an                  
attempt to illustrate the enmity transfer phenomenon by putting some of the key subjects of the                
analyzed articles on the ​"Spectrum of enmity"​. This figure shows the transfer of the audience’s               
perception: from enemies like the Third Reich or the USA to Ukrainians. On the opposite side of                 
the spectrum, we can also see how the fake separatist republics get the recognition and positive                
attribution. This figure also demonstrates the polarisation of Ukraine through the division frame.             
The block arrows indicate some of the devices used to achieve the enmity frame, while arrows                
names “saving” and “curating” describe the meta-meaning attached to it. 
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 Figure 4. The Enmity spectrum. Transfer of enemy and ally attributions by Russian 
propaganda in the analyzed materials of 2013-2014 
 
Overall, through this investigation, I was able to address the research questions thoroughly and              
validate the hypothesis that the Russian state-funded online media indeed do work as a body of                
state propaganda. They did play a crucial role in the info-warfare campaigns preceding and              
during Russian military operations in Crimea and Donbas by manipulating and distorting            
information to frame Kremlin's agenda, creating and reinforcing enemy images, spreading           
disinformation and conspiracy theories that resonated with the state's position.  
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 This research presents a significant social value for a number of reasons. Firstly, it contributes to                
the pool of investigations that expose a strong Kremlin's commitment to informational warfare             
on many fronts. Secondly, it confirms that the creation of enemy images is vital for the                
justification of military aggression. Lastly, it proves that even though modern state propaganda is              
a highly sophisticated, data-driven engine, on a rhetorical level, it still uses the same techniques               
as 100 years ago.  
 
In the research process, I have applied and combined several communication theories, which             
helped me to address the research questions. Even though framing theory is relatively new and               
has been previously criticized as a fractured paradigm (Entman 1993), this study has proven the               
validity of D’Angelo's (2002) multiparadigmatic approach to framing theory. Having chosen the            
critical paradigm for this framing research (Kuypers 2009), I was able to apply concepts of               
enemy images and propaganda devices to the process model of framing (Figure 3), thus adjusting               
it to be more informational-warfare oriented. To my knowledge, this is the first research that has                
combined these three principles to address the framing of enemy images by state propaganda.              
This approach can be used in future research that aims to tackle enmity framing in various                
contexts. 
 
My study has helped to solidify the concept of enemy images by recognizing them as an active                 
component of the framing process, equivalent to audience frames (Figure 3). It also             
demonstrated that propaganda devices introduced by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in            
1937 (Miller 1937), are still relevant today. Moreover, they function as framing devices in the               
frame building process.  
 
The process model of framing research (Figure 3), developed by Dietram A. Scheufele (1999),              
was used as a theoretical cornerstone of this study. All the applications mentioned above have               
proven it to be a lean and reliable framework.  
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6.2 Critical Evaluation of The Research 
I used Tracy's (2010) guidelines for qualitative research assessment in order to critically evaluate              
this study. With the conflict between Russia and Ukraine staying unresolved and the increasing              
spread of media manipulations worldwide, the topic of this research is proving to be timely and                
relevant. As a Ukrainian citizen and a former journalist, I am morally and emotionally invested               
in this study. As a communications scholar, I am most interested in the credibility of this                
research and the accuracy of its findings. Therefore, I tried to eliminate any biases while being                
guided by my moral, critical, and professional compasses.  
 
Following the guidelines of Kuypers (2009), I was able to apply the rhetorical perspective to my                
framing analysis which has proven to be a reliable method for this in-depth investigation.              
However, every method has its limitations. With the sample covering two timeframes of three              
months each, it is expected that the thematic range of the sample is somewhat limited to the                 
events relevant to those timeframes. The rhetorical nature of the analysis inevitably excludes             
visual elements of framing and enmity setting which certainly play a big part in the propaganda                
process. These two elements can be potentially combined in a bigger scale research project.              
Lastly, due to its time and resource limitations, this investigation focuses only on online news               
and analytical publication, thus excluding other mediums, channels, and formats that are used in              
propaganda. 
 
During the analysis, following the instructions of Marais and Linström (2012: 30), I was able to                
identify a dominant and secondary frame in most of the articles. According to Marais and               
Linström (ibid.), “the dominant frame is the main theme of the news article, while the secondary                
frame is a supplementary idea that supports the main theme.” However, I have faced two               
challenges applying this approach to some publications, especially long ones. Firstly, in these             
articles (e.g. 14-4;14-7;14-8), it was difficult to identify only one dominant frame as there were               
several themes framed with relatively equal value in those cases. Secondly and subsequently,             
those frames were relatively independent, which made it hard to categorize them in a              
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power-relation of dominant and secondary. I found those challenges quite useful and particularly             
fascinating as they show that framing is a complicated and fluid process. It also reassured me                
that the in-depth qualitative analysis was the right method to choose for this research as it was                 
unlikely I would be able to spot those dynamics with a quantitative approach. 
 
To address those challenges, I used the metaphor of atoms and molecules and applied it to media                 
frames. It helped me make sense of the power dynamics between different frames I had               
identified in my analysis, and I hope it will help the reader as well. In my illustration, I compare                   
a media publication to a molecule that consists of frames or atoms. It can be a single frame that                   
sets a specific agenda. It can be two or more frames of the same “element” (dominant and                 
secondary frames relations). Or it can be two or more independent frames that come together in                
one molecule/article and create a more complex message. What I specifically like about this              
analogy is that it illustrates how fluid informational space is and how, similarly to atoms and                
molecules, frames and media publications do not just exist by themselves — they react, collide               
and combine into more complex systems of meanings. The process model of framing by Dietram               
Scheufele (Figure 3) and my enmity spectrum illustration (Figure 4) illustrate the high level of               
this media “ecosystem” dynamics quite well. This approach has helped me identify eight             
dominant and secondary frames (Table 3) through the process of conducting this research             
project.  
 
This study provides significant social and theoretical contributions in respective fields. Its            
methodological approach, theoretical and practical findings are welcome to be tested in different             
contexts and languages in future research. 
 
6.3 Future Research Recommendations 
In the results section, it has been voiced that Russia conveys a sophisticated propaganda strategy               
that creates distorted realities. It is challenging to fight propaganda and disinformation and break              
the bubbles of the post-truth. Therefore, counter-propaganda is often forced to use the same              
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techniques, which only intensifies informational warfare. With that in mind, a natural            
progression of this research would be conducting a similar analysis of Ukrainian state-funded             
media within the same time frame and comparing it with this study. I am curious to see if/how                  
some of the concepts explored within this investigation (e.g., enmity transfer, enmity spectrum)             
will translate into Ukrainian context, what are the dominant frames in Ukrainian media and what               
is the frame dynamics between Russian and Ukrainian publications. Such development can            
provide a better understanding of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the modern propaganda and            
counter-propaganda theory, as well as the use of language in enemy creation. 
 
The methodological approach, theoretical and practical findings of this study are welcome to be              
examined in different contexts, conflict levels, mediums, and languages. Particularly the           
concepts of "enmity transfer" and "enmity spectrum" deserve further examination in various            
settings. One of the possible applications could be a rhetorical framing analysis of a non-armed               
conflict that may provoke the creation of enemy images. It could be a political campaign               
preceding elections or other significant decisions. The rhetorical analysis of the enmity framing             
in different mediums like press, TV, radio, various social media platforms, is also likely to enrich                
existing knowledge in the field. 
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Appendix 
Table 3. Dominant Frames and Propaganda Devices 
Media Channel, 
Article 
Reference 
Number, and 
Date 
Title (English 
translation) 
Dominant Frames Secondary Frames Propaganda 
Devices 
RT 13-1 
(22.06.2013) 
On the night of June 22, 
“candles of memory” 
were lit in the countries 
of the former USSR  
Unity of the two 
nations 
- Glittering 
generalities 
RT 13-2 
(27.07.2013) 
Vladimir Putin: The 
Ukrainian economy, 
combined with the 
Russian, will receive 
great competitive 
advantages 
Unity of the two 
nations 
- The Testimonial 
device 
RT 13-3 
(28.07.2013) 
Vladimir Putin 
congratulated Russian 
and Ukrainian sailors 
Unity of the two 
nations 
- The Testimonial 
device 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-4 
(08.05.2013) 
The dress rehearsal of 
the military parade of 
Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation took place in 
Sevastopol 
Unity of the two 
nations 
- - 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-5 
(29.05.2013) 
Memorandum on 
Ukraine’s participation 
in the Customs Union 
will be signed in Minsk 
on May 31 
- - - 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-6 
(09.05.2013) 
Victory Day in Ukraine: 
a holiday with tears in 
the eyes 
The division frame Unity of the two 
nations 
 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-7 
(27.07.2013) 
BTR drowned during a 
rehearsal for the Day of 
the Fleet of Ukraine in 
Sevastopol 
- -  
Rossiya 
Segodnia 13-8 
(27.07.2013) 
Putin thanked 
Yanukovych for 
meeting at the 
celebrations in Kyiv 
Unity of the two 
nations 
- The Testimonial 
device 
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RT 14-1 
(15.05.2014) 
People's Governor of the 
DPR Gubarev presented 
a new ultimatum to the 
Kyiv authorities 
Legitimizing 
terrorism; 
Independence of 
Donbas 
 Name-calling; 
Glittering 
generalities; The 
Transfer device; 
Card stacking 
RT 14-2 
(01.07.2014) 
Ukrainian forces 
resumed the active 
phase of the punitive 
operation in the east of 
the country 
Legitimizing 
terrorism 
Ukrainians are 
suffering 
Name-calling; 
Glittering 
generalities; Card 
stacking 
RT 14-3 
(13.07.2014) 
The assault of Mariupol 
by the Ukrainian force 
officers - the first photos 
and videos from the 
scene 
Legitimizing 
terrorism 
 Name-calling; 
Glittering 
generalities; Card 
stacking 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-4 
(19.06.2014) 
Punitive peacekeeping. 
President of Ukraine 
declared war 
The USA as a chaos 
curator; 
Legitimizing 
terrorism 
Ukraine is divided; 
Ukrainians are 
suffering; 
Grammatical 
separatism 
Name-calling; 
Glittering 
generalities; The 
Transfer device; 
Plain folks 
technique; Card 
stacking 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-5 
(14.07.2014) 
"Internal War" on [in] 
Ukraine - Petro 
Poroshenko as 
Ukrainian Pinochet 
The division frame; 
Independence of 
Donbas; The USA as 
a chaos curator  
Legitimizing 
terrorism; 
Ukrainians are 
suffering 
Name-calling; 
Glittering 
generalities; The 
Transfer device; The 
Testimonial device; 
Card stacking 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-6 
(17.07.2014) 
Obama Bin Laden. The 
USA hit Russia right in 
the "sector" 
The USA as a chaos 
curator 
The USA started the 
conflict in Ukraine 
to destabilize Russia 
Name-calling; 
Glittering 
generalities; The 
Transfer device; 
Plain folks 
technique; Card 
stacking 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-7 
(18.07.2014) 
Useless zone. Ukraine 
has officially become a 
"black hole" 
Ukraine downed the 
MH17 plane; 
Ukrainians are 
suffering; 
Independence of 
Donbas  
Facts don't matter, 
everyone will be 
judging based on 
their opinion 
 
Rossiya 
Segodnia 14-8 
(31.07.2014) 
Residents of Maryinka: 
force officers used 
phosphorus-like shells 
Independence of 
Donbas; 
Legitimizing 
terrorism;  
Ukrainians are 
suffering 
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